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Synopsis 
 
This thesis is a critical survey of Christine Korsgaard’s arguments regarding the rational 
basis for moral obligations. I focus on her arguments taking us from the categorical 
imperative to the Moral Law. She makes a distinction that Kant does not; claiming that 
the categorical imperative is not the Moral Law. In order to equate rational agency with 
moral agency Korsgaard therefore needs some additional arguments. These arguments, I 
argue, are not convincing. My claim is that they do not succeed in establishing the 
necessity which Korsgaard actually attributes to moral obligations, nor support her idea 
that our moral identity is inescapable.  
In the first chapter, I give an interpretation of her view pointing to some 
similarities and differences between her arguments and those of Hume and Kant. 
Central to my discussion is the tension in her position due to arguing in accordance with 
Hume that morality is grounded in human nature, and at the same time arguing in 
accordance with the Kantian idea of autonomy as the answer to our quest for 
responsibility. Her view is vague concerning the important distinction between rational 
nature and human nature; a vagueness that is accentuated by her introduction of the 
notion of procedural realism.  
Both Kant and Korsgaard are commonly taken to be constructivists. In the 
second chapter, I explore this aspect of her view by taking into account some 
constructivist ideas as presented by Scanlon and Rawls. I argue that Korsgaard, unlike 
Scanlon and Rawls, takes constructivism too far. She distinguishes between our third 
personal perspective of explanation and our first person perspective of deliberation: It is 
from the first person perspective of deliberation that we both justify and construct 
central and related concepts like the categorical imperative, morality, our identity, 
normativity and value. It is difficult to see how she can argue in this manner without 
running into problems concerning self-reference and circularity. 
A key problem is her conception of deliberation as a procedure separating our 
inclinations from our reasoning. In the third chapter I therefore explore further her 
conception of deliberation, and in particular the role emotions may play. I also compare 
her notion of identity with Allison and Scanlon’s conception of a self, in order to 
support my suspicion that her view is based on some sort of naturalism. I argue that the 
duality she requires from our deliberate standpoint puts an unnecessary strong demand 
on the causality of human reasoning. But is naturalism the only plausible explanation of 
how Korsgaard’s claim for necessity can be met? Perhaps she does what Kant did; 
justify necessity by transcendental arguments?  
In the last chapter, I explore whether or not her arguments are transcendental, 
and I conclude that her arguments cannot establish the necessity she requires from our 
obligations. By distinguishing between the categorical imperative and the Moral Law, 
she opens up for the possibility of autonomous agency equating rational agency, rather 
than moral agency as she had set forth to show. It is actually questionable whether she 
manages to establish that rational agency is autonomous too. But why should the fact 
that we are the source of the law that binds us, necessarily lead to freedom and 
responsibility? For Kant and Korsgaard this seems to be the solution to the problems 
arising out of seeing nature as deterministic and having an absolutistic conception of 
egoism. If one did let go of these – in my opinion unnecessary – worries, autonomy is 
perhaps not the answer to our quest for responsibility.  
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1.0 From the categorical imperative to the Moral Law 
In this thesis I intend to present a critical survey of Christine Korsgaard’s arguments 
taking us from the categorical imperative to the Moral Law. The law which can be 
understood as telling us that we must take other peoples reasons into consideration in 
situations of choice and action. I will primarily base my interpretation on her writings in 
Creating the Kingdom of Ends1 and in the Sources of Normativity2. In these books 
Korsgaard can be understood as arguing for a rational basis for morality in terms of 
obligations. To establish the Moral Law, she presents arguments that may be said to go 
through three phases3: the foundation of the categorical imperative, to see the value in 
one’s own humanity and to recognize the value in others. Korsgaard’s arguments may 
be seen as a response to Kant, claiming what he did not; that the categorical imperative 
is different from the Moral Law. 
In this first chapter my aim is to present Korsgaard’s discussion of Kant’s view 
with regards to the relation between the categorical imperative and the Moral Law. Then 
I will critically explore her view on the very same issue. In the following chapters I will 
discuss aspects of her arguments which I find problematic or unclear; difficulties mainly 
due to the claim of necessity Kant attributes to both the categorical imperative and to 
moral obligations. This claim, I will argue, Korsgaard’s view does not obviously meet.  
 
1.1 The quest for responsibility 
Despite their differences, I find that both Kant and Korsgaard appear to take as a 
starting point the quest for responsibility. To consider human beings as not responsible 
for their thoughts and actions may seem like both  an unappealing and impossible idea if 
at the same time, we are to view ourselves as having some kind of identity that has an 
impact on our lives. However, to argue for a view that holds that we actually are 
responsible also gives rise to several challenges, challenges often the result of the 
commonly assumed connection between responsibility and the idea of a free will. In 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals4, Kant poses the following problem: 
 
                                                 
1 Christine Korsgaard, 1996b, Creating the Kingdom of Ends. 
2 Christine Korsgaard, 1996a, The Sources of Normativity 
3 Stern does in ”Transcendental argumentation” argue for this division of her argument 
4 Kant, Groundwork of  the Metaphysics of Morals,…, trans.Mary Gregor, Cambridge University Press 
1997. 
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“there arises a dialectic of reason since, with respect to the will, the freedom ascribed to 
it seems to be in contradiction with natural necessity” (Kant 1997, p.60, 4:455) 
 
Kant seems to both hold that we are rational beings with a will that acts under the idea 
of freedom5 and, at the same time, when reasoning about the possibility of experience 
we realize that everything is determined by the laws of nature. Thus our reason appears 
to give rise to the contradictory beliefs that we, on the one hand, have a will and in that 
sense our actions are free and undetermined while, on the other hand, as agents in the 
world of nature our will is also causality and must as such have some law or principle in 
accordance with the laws of nature. However, what is the source for such a law if it is 
not to be determined by external powers, and how is it possible for freedom to imply 
law? Kant’s answer to this is that there still is the possibility that we can make laws to 
ourselves – that we are autonomous6. Hence the apparent contradiction is to him not a 
real problem. Our will is autonomous and its law is what Kant called a categorical 
imperative, formulated by the Formula of Universal Law: 
 
“act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will 
that it become a universal law.“(Kant 1997, p.31, 4:421) 
 
Kant is commonly understood to equate this formula with what he refers to as the Moral 
Law, this being due to the idea that universal ranges over all rational beings. To 
understand Kant’s arguments is a complex task that has given rise to a variety of 
interpretations. I will not try to justify these here, but rather focus on the view of 
Christine Korsgaard who poses a similar problem to Kant. However, her solution 
differs, or as she says7 ‘universalizability does not get us to morality’ since 
universalizability cannot bridge the gap between what is a reason for you to act from, 
from what is a reason for me to act. Thus Korsgaard wishes to improve on this often 
considered weakness in Kant’s argument by presenting some additional arguments to 
the Kantian ones in order to bridge this gap from the free will to moral obligations. 
Here, I will critically explore these arguments given by Korsgaard and first begin by 
looking at the area in her argumentations where she claims to agree with Kant – namely 
                                                 
5 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, p.53, trans.Mary Gregor, Cambridge University Press 
1997. 
6 Autonomy as the solution to this problem will be critically discussed in the last chapter. 
7 Korsgaard 1996a, p. 221. 
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on how to establish that we are autonomous beings. Second, I will explore her argument 
from the categorical imperative to the Moral Law; an argument which seems to rest 
upon a un-Kantian assumption that the content of the Moral Law is based upon what she 
calls our conception of our practical identity. Only by identifying yourselves 
normatively with others, by having the self-conception of being a member of a social 
community, can the law given by the categorical imperative be the Moral Law she 
claims. 
 
1.2 The categorical imperative as the law of a free will  
A major concern in most ethical theories is how to deal with the concepts of the good 
and the right, and in particular in what way these concepts are related. Since ‘the good’ 
may say to be about how we want things to be and “the right” on what we should or 
must do, both concepts are important due to their alleged motivational force on our 
decisions and actions. Teleology8 is the view often associated with attributing values to 
state of affairs, or on how things may become. These are matters with their own 
independent value. Often is the teleological view combined with a consequentialist 
view, a view that emphasizes the importance of the consequences of an action, 
consequences which may be stated as facts. Korsgaard disagrees with the teleological 
conception – at least as telling the whole truth. Instead Korsgaard argues in agreement 
with the following interpretation of Kant: In contrast to Aristotle and Plato, Kant said, 
that “reason - which is form - isn’t in the world, but is something that we impose upon 
it.”(Korsgaard 1996a, pp.4-5). Thus if the good or form is not considered what is real, 
where does this leave the issue of value? According to this view, value is imposed upon 
the world of matter; it is an obligation. Thus rather than searching for value, we create 
value in the world around us, forced by our obligations - it is like a work of art - 
Korsgaard explains. As rational beings, we determine our ends by being the ones who 
determine value, and we have duties to have these ends. According to her, the 
underlying idea is that “the reason why a good-willed person does an action, and the 
reason why the action is right, is the same” (Korsgaard 1996b, p. 61). A good-willed 
person is not motivated by private purposes, but acts from necessity that it is a law to 
have a certain purpose. Korsgaard says that Kant distinguishes between two kinds of 
                                                 
8 Including the view of Aristotle. 
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motivation; autonomous and heteronomous. To be heteronomously motivated is to act 
according to some interest, where a hypothesis connects your interest to the law which 
binds you. The command to perform the action is hypothetical in the sense that we can 
choose to give up the action by changing our interests. However, Korsgaard continues, 
we need to be unconditionally bound by an imperative - an ought -on what to do 
otherwise duty does not obligate us by necessity. Moral motivation has to be 
autonomous, that is to be autonomously motivated is understood as acting on laws you 
have set to yourself. Which acts are right depends on our maxims, where maxims may 
be understood as our underlying aims, intentions, subjective principles or reasons for 
acting; it is our inclinations such as those of desires, tastes and feelings. However a 
rational or good-willed person should not act upon a maxim unless it can also serve as 
an imperative categorically, meaning by necessity and independently of private 
concerns. This is the idea of the categorical imperative, the principle of autonomy, as 
we recall as formulated in Kant’s Formula of Universal Law: 
 
“act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will 
that it become a universal law.” (Kant 1997, p.31, 4:421) 
 
The categorical imperative is the law of the free will Korsgaard continues, because all it 
says is that we should choose a law. Thus it places no alien constraints to the free will, 
merely says what the will must do in order to be a free will – it must will a maxim to be 
a universal law. The categorical imperative is not an analytic (by definition) judgement, 
but synthetic a priori in the sense of telling us something substantial, something new 
about its subject, but still based solely upon reasoning and not upon experience.  
 
1.3 Kant’s different formulas of the categorical imperative  
How to link the categorical imperative to the Moral Law is an issue where Korsgaard’s 
view differs radically from Kant. I will now present Korsgaard’s critical interpretation 
of Kant on this as given in The Sources of Normativity and in Creating the Kingdom of 
Ends.  
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According to Korsaard, the concept of freedom is introduced by Kant as a 
solution to a problem9; the categorical imperative is not analytic and as such not 
inconsistent whatever claims are made, and at the same time it is claimed to consist in 
rational necessity Korsgaard explains. To answer this one must first show that a free 
person is one who follows the Moral Law then show that a rational person considers 
themself as being free. To the first question concerning how we can come from the 
Kantian argument from free will to morality Korsgaard finds that Kant has a good 
answer. More problematic she - and according to her also Kant, and several of his 
interpreters - finds the relation between freedom and rationality and the argument that 
being rational implies acting in accordance with the Moral Law. To explain this Kant 
puts forward two very different arguments10, one in the Groundwork which he denotes a 
deduction, and the other in the Critique of Practical Reason. Korsgaard11 reconstructs 
Kant’s argument given in the Groundwork in short as follows: the existence of a 
categorical imperative implies that there must be something unconditionally valuable, 
something being an end to itself and as such could be the source of laws. This end must 
be completely justified and be a necessary end to every rational or good will. According 
to Korsgaard Kant equates humanity with such a rational will, so what is 
unconditionally valuable is humanity. Hence the unconditional end required for the 
categorical imperative to determine the will, is humanity. This, Korsgaard claims, 
brings Kant to another formulation of the categorical imperative, the Formula of 
Humanity: 
 
“So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any 
other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.” (Kant 1997, p. 38, 
4:429) 
 
This is a very strong requirement - to never merely treat someone as means. This 
requirement appears to be based on a view that egoism in an absolute sense is the 
challenge. This in my opinion is an unnecessary strong demand to put on our actions. I 
will return to this discussion later. First I will continue my exploration of Kant’s 
arguments: So if rational beings determine ends, and are the sources of value, rational 
                                                 
9 Korsgaard 1996b, p. 160. 
10 Allison, Kant’s theory of freedom, p. 2, Korsgaard 1996 b),  p. 161. 
11 Korsgaard, 1996b, pp.12 – 27. 
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beings must value themselves and as such consider themselves as ends. Rational beings 
are autonomous, and rational nature is an objective end. We consider other humans as 
important by worshipping ourselves and our humanity, which is what may move us to 
act morally. It is about respect for human beings, but only insofar as they are rational, 
and we will be moved only insofar that we are rational. So what ultimately motivates us 
is the emotion respect, respect for the moral law and for ourselves and other rational 
beings. This leads Kant, according to Korsgaard, to the idea of an ideal community 
where everyone considers one another as ends in themselves – a community he called 
The Kingdom of Ends. With this he presents the third alternative way of formulating the 
categorical imperative: 
 
“A rational being must always regard himself as lawgiving in a kingdom of ends.”(Kant  
1997, p. 42, 4:434) 
 
Hence the law which we would rationally choose when being governed by the 
categorical imperative is the Moral Law. By stating this Korsgaard argues that to Kant 
the Formula of Universal Law is the Moral Law. It is a practical law applying to all 
members of the kingdom of ends, and to follow this principle is practical necessity – it 
is a duty. But how can universalizability lead us to the Moral Law, Korsgaard asks? 
Why does it have to range over human beings? Does the Formula of Universal Law 
have moral content, or is it perhaps what several critics suggest, an empty formalism12? 
If this empty formalism is equated with the Moral Law, does it leave the Moral Law 
empty as well? Perhaps by investigating how one is supposed to apply the categorical 
imperative one can answer these questions. 
Korsgaard argues that the claim that the moral law is empty is wrong. According 
to her Kant argued that if all rational beings could agree, that such a maxim could be a 
law for all members of the Kingdom of Ends, then the categorical imperative would 
have content. But how can you tell whether you are able to will your maxim as a 
universal law, Korsgaard asks13. Kant’s answer to this question is, according to 
Korsgaard, to seek universalization without contradiction. By imagining a world in 
which a maxim is being universalized, Korsgaard interprets Kant as meaning a world in 
                                                 
12 ’No content’ objections have been made by Mill, Hegel and his followers. (Korsgaard 1996a, p. 222). 
13 Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends p.14. 
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which the maxim is envisioned as a law of nature. The arguments which Kant gives to 
show that our maxims must undergo a test of universalizability are summarized by 
Korsgaard in the following way14: we must act under the idea of freedom or under the 
idea that we have a free will. This means that we act as if we were not determined by 
any external (to the will) forces or laws. However, Kant defines a free will as rational 
causality, meaning something which is a cause without being determined by anything 
alien to it. As alien to our will all our inclinations and emotions are included as well as 
issues completely external to us. This leaves us with a problem: how can the will be 
completely self-determining and, at the same time, be causality and as such act in 
accordance with laws? Kant’s answer to this is that the will is autonomous – it has its 
own law. This gives rise to a second problem. Where does this law come from? It 
cannot be external to the will, since then the will is not free. Thus the will must make a 
law to itself, and the law of the free will is the categorical imperative(as the law of 
autonomy) as given in the Formula of Universal Law. Hence he proposed a test seeking 
to establish what one can will without contradiction. 
 
“To determine whether you can will your maxim at the same time as its universalization 
without contradiction, you envision trying to will your maxim in a world in which the 
maxim is universalized – in which it is a law of nature.”(Korsgaard 1996b, p.14) 
 
In what she calls “the Practical Contradiction Interpretation” our will is causality, and 
we must consider the relation between our reasons or purpose to perform an action and 
the action as universalizable, as a law, without contradictions, and if not our reasons are 
not sufficient15. Our non-moral maxims cannot in this view serve as practical laws. Thus 
Korsgaard argues that the contradiction test manages to provide some of the content of 
morality, since it is capable of deciding the moral content of some maxims. Hence it 
shows that the Moral Law is not empty. But, she continues, it does not manage to give 
us the whole content of morality, and more importantly it does not establish that being 
bound by the categorical imperative implies that you are bound by the Moral Law.  The 
Kantian argument shows the categorical imperative to be the law of a free will, but it 
does not establish the same for the Moral Law16. 
                                                 
14 Korsgaard,1996a, p.219, p97. 
15 Korsgaard 1996b, p.102. 
16 Korsgaard 1996a, p. 99. 
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Thus in this respect Korsgaard’s view diverges from Kant. The difference is due 
to the domain of the law constituted by the free will. According to Korsgaard, the law of 
the free will does not necessarily include the Kingdom of Ends: it is not decided 
whether the categorical imperative range over rational beings, human beings, moral 
agents or something else. According to Korsgaard, the categorical imperative is the law 
saying that you should only act on maxims you would want to be a law. It is a law of the 
free will in the sense that all it asks from us is to choose a law, but it places no 
constraints on how this law should be; rather, it puts constraints on its form. The Moral 
Law, on the other hand, does place such constraints on the content of the law; it 
demands that one must agree to the law. But does not the universalizability requirement 
in the formula of universal law imply that the law is for all rational beings? No, 
Korsgaard replies17. All that universalizability requirements do is to say that if 
something is rational for me to do for egoistic purposes, then I must agree that it would 
be rational for you to go for your interests. However, this does not make your interest 
normative to me. What does this really mean? That by universal Korsgaard means 
general, in the sense of something which will always have a hold on me, as a law in the 
sense of ‘always’ and not in the sense of ‘for everyone’? She appears to consider 
universal as something which could apply to only one person, but which probably 
would also be attractive for others in the same situation. Does this mean that the 
categorical imperative could have a hold on us, without having other human beings 
within its domain and, if so, would this action be rational? I believe she has to answer 
yes to the first questions; there will be occasions where something is a reason for me 
without being a reason for others. Korsgaard’s distinction between the categorical 
imperative and the Moral Law seems to make some acts of egoism rational. But, if it 
seems rational for me to follow a principle, it will probably seem rational for another 
rational being as well. However again, this does not, according to Korsgaard, give us 
morality18. This makes one suspect that she may hold another conception of rationality 
than Kant, a conception seeing rational and universal as distinct matters. One way to 
avoid this problem concerning how to come from egoism to morality, is of course, to 
interpret universal differently than Korsgaard. This is exactly what Tim Scanlon is 
interpreted as doing in What We Owe to Each Other. He argues that a universal law is a 
                                                 
17 Korsgaard 1996a, p. 221. 
18 Korsgaard 1996a, p. 221. 
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law for everybody19 and not as Korsgaard seems to mean general in the sense of always. 
However, his view is heteronomously based, and as such I guess Korsgaard would 
argue cannot provide the necessity she requires from moral obligations. Her claim that 
all the categorical imperative is, is a law, which has no content other than structure. 
Korsgaard concludes that universalizability does not imply morality. But how then does 
she argue her way from the categorical imperative to the Moral Law? To answer this 
she presents a two-fold argument: 
 
“first, that the universal laws required by our conception of ourselves as agents must 
range over human beings as such; and second that the reasons that are derived from 
these laws are public.”(Korsgaard 1996a, p. 233) 
 
Hence, in order to come to morality one needs a further two arguments in addition to the 
categorical imperative Korsgaard claims. First, she wishes to establish that rational 
actions exist and are related to placing value in one’s own humanity. Second, she gives 
an argument equating valuing one’s own humanity with seeing the value in the 
humanity of others. To give an account of Korsgaard’s arguments from the categorical 
imperative to the Moral Law requires that I say something about reflective endorsement 
and practical identity, so I start by doing that and will then outline the arguments. 
 
1.4 Reflective endorsement and practical identity 
The Kantian test as to whether or not we can act on some maxim, depends on which 
maxims we could will as a universal law. The procedure he uses according to 
Korsgaard, is one of reflective scrutiny, aiming at rejecting maxims which lead to some 
sort of contradiction. This procedure, she continues, is similar to the procedure of 
‘reflective endorsement’20, a method she attributes to Hume, Mill and Bernard 
Williams. Korsgaard explains that for Hume because that morality has its foundation in 
human sentiments, the normative question is how good morality is and not whether it is 
true or not. Bernard Williams, she continues, is likewise concerned about whether we 
have reasons to endorse our dispositions. Even Mill uses the method of reflective 
endorsement when answering the question of normativity of our obligations. Thus, 
                                                 
19 Parfit What We Could Rationally Will. 
20 Korsgaard 1996a, pp.49-130. 
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according to Korsgaard, the reflective endorsement method is one of reflection, based 
upon the idea that the ultimate source of which reasons we have for action lies in human 
nature. But what does she mean by that? To claim that Hume’s theory is normative, 
Korsgaard admits, is a controversial claim. She bases her view on the fact that Hume’s 
division between the ways we deal with moral philosophy into theoretical and practical 
philosophy. From a theoretical point of view what we want is to explain moral concepts, 
while the practical philosopher wishes to persuade and convince people to behave in 
certain ways. But then, how does one deal with justification? For this Korsgaard 
attributes to Hume the idea that it will emerge by the interaction between the theoretical 
and practical views of philosophy. So in this sense Hume’s theory is normative 
according to Korsgaard. Human nature is intrinsically normative, so morality can only 
be challenged from the standpoint internal to human nature. From this internal 
standpoint morality and self-interest are coherent notions, since we have (or perhaps 
couldn’t have?) no reasons to disapprove of morality since it is our nature. What 
Korsgaard seeks is a test for normativity in order to decide what we can take to be a 
reason for action. When through reflection we reach endorsement concerning our 
reasons, we approve or adopt these reasons. Korsgaard’s project is to argue that “the 
logical consequence of the theory of normativity shared by Hume, Mill and Williams is 
the moral philosophy of Kant”21. But in what sense can the view of Hume lead to Kant’s 
view? By claiming this I believe that one problem is that the method of reflective 
endorsement seems to be based on the idea that the source of normativity is in human 
nature, and not in rational nature which is how Kant is commonly understood22.  
 
“Kant, like the realist, thinks we must show that particular actions are right and 
particular ends are good. Each impulse as it offers itself to the will must pass a kind of 
test for normativity before we can adopt it as a reason for action. But the test that it must 
pass is not the test of knowledge or truth. For Kant, like Hume and Williams, thinks that 
morality is grounded in human nature, and that moral properties are projections of 
human dispositions. So the test is one of reflective endorsement.”(Korsgaard 1996a, p. 
91) 
 
Here Korsgaard comes with the somewhat controversial claim that Kant grounds 
morality in human nature. Does this mean that Korsgaard equates human nature with 
                                                 
21 Korsgaard 1996a, p. 51. 
22 Cohen gives a similar reply to Korsgaard in Reason, Humanity, and the Moral Law, Korsgaard 1996a 
pp.167-188. 
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rational nature, and that she also believes that Kant did? If this is the case, what does 
she really mean by conceptions like autonomy, the good will, rational will and freedom? 
Not obviously the same I believe Kant had in mind, as something based upon what 
transcend human nature. 
Anyway, both Kant and Korsgaard seem to argue against the view that morality 
is based upon truths and objective values, and that knowledge is the source of 
normativity. Rather Korsgaard claims, the source of normativity is in human nature, and 
so what we need for normativity is confidence – not knowledge. Korsgaard argues that 
one of the things which distinguish us from other living creatures is exactly that we are 
capable of being self-conscious. Our mind is reflective in the sense that we can both pay 
attention to our mental activities and observe them from a distance. When we find 
ourselves with an impulse to act, such as a desire or a perception, we step back and 
evaluate whether these impulses really are reasons to act or not. The reflective mind 
requires reasons in order to act, and to be aware of such a reason means one has been 
successful in reflection. This reflective structure of our mind and, our self-conception 
possible because of it is what Korsgaard considers to be as being the conception of our 
own practical identity; practical because of our ability to identify our reasons and to 
identify within the source of those reasons, reasons about what to do. So, it is not what 
would have been the aim of theoretical reflection to find out what is in the normative 
part of the world. It is this conception of us, as a practical identity, that gives rise to 
obligation. Obligations are a reaction to what your practical identity will not allow to 
happen. If you violate your self conception you loose your identity, so obligations arises 
when your identity is threatened. 
 
“If reasons arise from reflective endorsement, then obligation arises from reflective 
rejection.”(Korsgaard 1996a, p. 102) 
 
The reflective structure of our consciousness implies that there must be some laws 
which make us command ourselves, which makes us obliged. Korsgaard continues to 
argue that the source of obligation is our autonomy, since it demands that you are a law 
unto yourself. Thus human nature - the reflective structure of our consciousness - is the 
source of normativity. However one of the main problems we may seem to have with 
regards to normativity is precisely due to this practical reflective nature. When we are 
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inclined to believe that that we ought to do something we can always question this 
conviction, we can wish to justify morality’s claims on us. She continues that if 
morality survives this kind of scrutiny, then morality is normative. This is the method 
she refers to as the ‘reflective endorsement method’. 
Where Hume and Williams seek to establish the normativity of our “moral 
dispositions and sentiment”23 Korsgaard considers Kant as going further than merely 
seeing it as a test justifying morality - it is morality. Hence Korsgaard continues, that 
what seemed to be a problem to normativity, our reflective nature, turned out to also be 
the solution to the problem. Morality is a process, a reflective one. The reflection in 
question according to Korsgaard is practical and concerns what to do. It is not 
theoretical, in the sense of reasoning about normativity. We distance ourselves from our 
motives, perceptions and desires – all of our inclinations - and by so doing, are able to 
choose between them. Thus being self-conscious in this sense, capable of reflecting 
about our own mental activities, is, she claims, the very expression of your will. It 
shows that you are not passively letting you desires decide what you do, instead you are 
actively choosing. This she says is because you have reasons for acting. However, that 
we are bound by the categorical imperative does not establish that we are bound by the 
moral law according to Korsgaard. To establish this we need to show that we have a 
conception of our self as a member of the Kingdom of Ends24. Korsgaard claims Kant 
does this by saying that our mind has a reflective structure which is the source of our 
self-consciousness. According to Korsgaard, Kant does not find this an argument in 
favour of the existence of a metaphysical self but rather as concerning what the 
deliberate process is like from a first person perspective. 
Korsgaard draws this line of thought further by claiming that when we 
deliberate, it is as if there is something disconnected from our desires, some kind of ego 
making our choices. According to Korsgaard human beings have a reflective nature, but 
to reflect requires some conception of a self, an identity. It is this identity that provides 
us with the reasons we need in order to act. What we take to be a reason depends on our 
practical identity, and we have several such identities she continues. For example, we 
can have the practical identity of being a mother, a teacher, an European, and all other 
different roles we may have. So, what count as a reason depends on these practical 
                                                 
23 Korsgaard 1996a, p. 89. 
24 Korsgaard 1996a, p. 100. 
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identities, in this sense what is a reason for me is not a reason for you. Our moral 
identity is the identity where we identify ourselves with others in the Kingdom of Ends. 
This moral identity is hence one of our practical identities, but different from our other 
identities in that it is inescapable Korsgaard claims. Any self conceptions inconsistent 
with you seeing yourself as a member of humanity must be avoided. Korsgaard says the 
feature most central to this necessary identity is that of being able to reflect – to be self-
conscious. Thus to avoid the scepticism of practical reasons humanity must be valued as 
such25. In this sense Korsgaard appears to equate moral identity with valuing one’s 
humanity, but is this not the same as claiming that our rational reasons are the same as 
our moral reasons? And how can she claim this, and at the same time argue for her 
understanding of universal as not necessarily ranging over other people. This, as I have 
argued, opens up for having reasons (rational) which are not moral reasons. How does 
she argue in order to show that our rational reasons are in fact our moral reasons? How 
does she justify that to see the value in ones own humanity entails seeing the value of 
the humanity in others? 
 
1.5 Seeing the value of one’s own humanity 
In summary, the arguments for seeing the value of one’s own humanity may be said to 
be something like as follows26: Action requires that we take something to be a reason to 
act. This means that I identify with my principle of choice; I have to see myself as the 
agent of the action. What I take as a reason must conform to my practical identity. 
Humanity is a practical identity to which all other identities must conform. To have this 
self-conception is due to valuing your reflective powers, which means valuing your 
humanity. You have to value your humanity, Korsgaard concludes. 
Thus Korsgaard claims that we must necessarily have a conception of a practical 
identity, our identity of humanity, in order to have reasons to act at all. Owing to being 
reflective agents capable of being self-conscious, we “are forced” to have a conception 
of ourselves. The source of normativity is reflection - it is human nature, she continues. 
It is by valuing your own humanity contingent values becomes necessary values. Hence 
                                                 
25 Korsgaard 1996a, p.122. 
26 A similar presentation is given by Stern in ”The Value of Humanity: Reflections on Korsgard’s 
Transcendental Argument 
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Korsgaard seems to ground necessity in the value of human nature, to the value of our 
reflective and rational powers. I suppose that it is in this sense that she equates human 
nature with rational nature, that the essence of both human and rational nature is 
reflection and the ability to be self-conscious. Thus, to consider human nature and 
rational nature as somewhat the same appears to be a necessary condition for this 
argument. If this is right it identifies a central difference between Kant and Korsgaard, 
associating Korsgaard’s view more with the view of Hume than that of Kant. 
Furthermore, this argument does not rule out egoism. An egoist could both accept 
instrumental reasoning as means to an end and value his own humanity. Further, an 
egoist may acknowledge the same features in others, that is acknowledge the egoism of 
others. What the egoist does not is to, by necessity value other people’s humanity and 
promotes their ends27. Korsgaard’s reply to these concerns is that the reasons of the 
egoist are private – or agent-relative - and to count as reason it must be public. So what 
does that mean, that Korsgaard thinks that egoism is impossible? Does valuing your 
humanity imply that you value the humanity in others? How do we come from our 
valuing our humanity, to valuing the humanity in others? To accomplish this Korsgaard 
one more argument is needed. 
 
1.6 The publicity of reasons and the value of others 
 
“The space of linguistic consciousness – the space in which meanings and reasons exists 
– is a space that we occupy together.”(Korsgaard 1996a, p. 145) 
 
We are obligated by reflection, Korsgaard says. Thus if someone is going to obligate 
me, it will require that I become aware of them, that they could somehow be involved in 
my reflections. We need to show that our reflections are not private – that reasons are 
not only normative for me. Korsgaard parallels her argument with that of Wittgenstein’s 
private language argument showing the normativity of linguistic meaning. The idea is 
that when our reflections result in formulations of which reasons we have (maxims), 
these are formulations that require language. Our maxim is communicable and, hence, 
                                                 
27 James Skidmore gives a similar explanation of an egoist in his paper “Scepticism About Practical 
Reason: Transcendental Arguments and their Limits”, p. 135. 
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not private in the sense that they are intelligible to others. Thus to value one’s own 
humanity or agency is communicable, and intelligible to others, and hence implies the 
value of humanity in general. This Korsgaard concludes, shows that we have moral 
reasons – owing to reasons being public. This ends her argument which took us from 
the categorical imperative to the Moral Law. However this argument is much criticized 
and among the problems discussed is how to understand Korsgaard’s conceptions of 
private and public. Are public reasons to be understood as reasons which we actually 
share or are they only to be considered as shareable? Can norms be private, can the 
egoist have obligations towards himself? Theo van Willigenburg28 presents in the paper 
“Shareability and Actual Sharing: Korsgaard’s Position on the Publicity of Reasons” an 
interpretation of Korsgaard as different from Kant due to Kant meaning that “reasons 
are necessarily shared because they cannot but count for every citizen of the Kingdom 
of Ends” (Willigenburg 2002, p.173). Korsgaard on the other hand claims according to 
Willigenburg that there is a difference between understanding publicity as meaning 
actual sharing or as meaning intelligibility. It is in making this distinction Korsgaard 
can claim that the argument for the categorical imperative does not take us to the Moral 
Law. I find this a plausible reading of Korsgaard, and will explore it further. It is a 
reading not making the Kantian assumption that shareability of reasons entails actual 
sharing. Or, at least to establish this relation one needs a further argument, Korsgaard 
claims. 
 
“It is because the standpoint created by consciousness can be made public by language 
or sympathy that reasons and values can be shared. But that kind of publicity is still 
inside the reflective standpoint. From outside of that standpoint, we can recognize the 
fact of value, but we cannot recognize value itself.”(Korsgaard 1996a, p. 161) 
 
Is this to be understood as some sort of internal publicity? In that case what she seems 
to argue for is the ability to share and not actual sharing as sufficient for also valuing the 
humanity in others. But is this really enough for us to be morally obligated, that we, by 
reflection, can understand that something is a reason for others? I interpret Korsgaard as 
meaning exactly this – reflection is the source of obligation: a view I assume is based on 
the idea that we have some common sense concerning what is intelligible.  
                                                 
28 Theo van Willigenburg, “Shareability and Actual sharing: Korsgaard’s position on the Publicity of 
Reasons”, pp.172-174. 
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“The private language argument does not show that I could not have my own personal 
language. But it shows that I could not have a language that is in principle 
incommunicable to anybody else. When I make a language, I make its meaning 
normative for me.” (Korsgaard 1996a, p.138) 
 
But, to make a language meaning normative to me does not in my opinion imply that 
this meaning needs to have to do with others, its meaning could very well be related to 
my own egoistic concerns. I will therefore argue against that the argument given by 
Korsgaard establishes what Willigenburg claims that it does, namely that “we cannot 
but share what is already inherently shareable”29. My argument will to some extent be in 
accordance with the ones of James Skidmore. In his paper “Scepticism about Practical 
Reason: Transcendental Arguments and their Limits” he argues30 that with an 
incommunicable language, I could not make mistakes, so there would be no 
normativity. But why should we only be concerned about moral ends? What about the 
rational ends - are they necessarily the same as our moral ends? With an 
incommunicable language I find that the problem concerning rational ends would rather 
be that we could end up always making mistakes, which, of course, would also be a 
problem to normativity – but of a very different kind. We would end up 
misunderstanding our own reflections. Korsgaard apparently argues in accordance with 
Skidmore on this, claiming that egoist reasons are agent-relative reasons, and cannot be 
normative. In order to be normative reasons they must be agent-neutral, or as she says – 
public. But why is this so? I do not think this rule out the normativity of egoists’ 
reasons, since an egoist could have a communicable language but choose not to 
communicate. Korsgaard would argue against this, saying that one can always intrude 
into someone’s consciousness, simply by talking to them. In this sense our 
consciousness is not private. However, I will argue, this is not always the case, and not 
for all of one’s reasons. Thus in my opinion, private reasons are still possible, and may 
be normative. This argument does not take Korsgaard from shareability to actual 
sharing for all of my reasons, only perhaps for some. I find that one of the problems 
with this argument is due to her conception of egoist, of which she says that: “if egoism 
is true, and reasons cannot be shared” (Korsgaard 1996a, p. 141) Which I find to be a 
                                                 
29 Willigenburg 2002, p. 189. 
30 Skidmore 2002,  pp. 135-137. 
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too strong demand of egoism for an egoist, that one either are an egoist or one are not, 
that ones an egoist always an egoist. The claim made by the Formula of Humanity that 
one must never merely treat others as means is too demanding. What about the more 
common situation in which sometimes one behaves egoistically and other times not? In 
this reading of Korsgaard’s conception of egoism, it seems to be like an inescapable 
identity - an identity contrasting the moral identity.  
Hence, I find that egoism is not ruled out by her argument, but then I mean 
egoism as understood in a weaker sense than what Korsgaard appears to mean. This I 
find to coincide well with her claim that the categorical imperative is different from the 
Moral Law. This division opens up the possibility that the categorical imperative may 
have a hold on us, without involving any moral claims. Thus, normativity in this 
necessary sense does not need to be moral, but can be solely rational. This again, I 
assume, means that one can imagine the rational egoist who can do wrong, not towards 
others, but towards his own rational ends. Normativity is thus possible due to the 
argument that one values one’s own humanity. Hence, I believe that what we have here 
that shareable is not the same as actual sharing in the sense that my reasons are always 
reasons for others. Morality is not intrinsic to my reasons. But if we did accept 
Korsgaard’s claim that to value your own humanity is to value the humanity in others, 
how does Korsgaard come from this to moral obligations?  To do this she claims to 
follow an argument of Thomas Nagel31: 
 
“You make yourself an end for others; you make yourself a law to them. But if you are 
a law to others in so far as you are just human, just someone, then the humanity of 
others is also a law to you. By making you think these thoughts, I force you to 
acknowledge the value of my humanity, and I obligate you to act in a way that respects 
it.” (Korsgaard 1996a, p. 143) 
 
Hence obligations are constructed by reflection, reflection which somehow forces us to 
take others into account. By identifying yourself with others, seeing what everyone has 
in common makes one take others reasons into account. It is by adopting the perspective 
of others that you become obligated, by reflecting and acknowledging the value of 
someone else’s humanity she continues. Imagine that we are reasoning together, sharing 
decisions by joining wills, Korsgaard says. Why, Korsgaard asks, should it be 
                                                 
31 Korsgaard 1996a, p.142, refers to Nagel’s argument in The Possibility of Altruism. 
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impossible to think that language can force us to union in both our thinking and in our 
practical reasoning? But how can she claim that this happens by necessity? Once again, 
I believe this is an argument of the shareability of our reasons and not necessarily what 
actually become our reasons for acting. I believe that the moral identity is escapable. 
This is in contrast to what Korsgaard means when claiming that “To treat your human 
identity as normative, as a source of reasons and obligations, is to have what I have 
been calling ‘moral identity’”(Korsgaard 1996a, p.129) where it seems that reasons and 
obligations are intimately connected if we are to consider our identity as normative. 
That we must have such a moral identity does not mean that it is the only identity; no 
one is only a moral agent, Korsgaard says. Moral obligations are not our only 
obligations, and do not always win32. Its superiority lies in that it cannot be denied 
unless one also rejects normativity and practical reasons. So moral obligations don’t 
always win, meaning egoism is possible. However, egoism is not normative; since 
egoist reasons are not reasons as such is what Korsgaard seems to believe. And, more 
importantly: that your moral obligations do not win; do not, as I read Korsgaard, imply 
that you loose your moral identity. I believe what she has in mind is rather to allow for 
some irrationality. Perhaps it is in this respect she considers her view to be practical and 
concerned with ‘real life’? Rationality and morality is in her view intimately connected. 
It is in this conclusion I disagree because it relates to egoism in too strict a sense, and 
seems to consider private what is not really private. Further it seems to assume that 
language to be necessarily normative must relate to moral beings, which I find 
implausible. 
A second problem is that I cannot see that this is coherent with other aspects of 
her view. If the categorical imperative is to be different from the Moral Law, this has to 
allow for some actions to be rational, meaning as being governed by the categorical 
imperative, without being moral which means that there are proper reasons for 
performing these actions, reasons that are not moral reasons. Either way, this 
interpretation is vitally different from the common understanding of Kant. To him, 
reasons are necessarily shared, egoism is not possible. But why has she chosen to argue 
so differently from Kant, but yet seems to relate to his strong demands concerning 
issues like determinism and egoism? One reason I assume is because of the problems 
                                                 
32 Korsgaard 1996a, p. 125. 
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she appears to find in his arguments based on his conception of rationality. Another, but 
related concern is that her view is accordingly more practical, aimed at dealing with our 
actual situations of choice and at the same time she somehow wish to take the ideal 
aspects into consideration.  
 
1.7 Double- versus single-level theories 
Kant is often criticized as having an ideal theory not very suitable for dealing with real 
life moral situations. One such situation Kant’s views are often considered not to be 
able to meet is how one can deal with others having evil ends without also accepting 
consequentialism. I suppose Korsgaard wishes to present a position capable of meeting 
this problem, but without giving up some of Kant’s central ideas. As this example of the 
murder shows, it is not always our duty to tell the truth: 
 
“Deadly knowledge: You ask me whether Grey committed some murder. I know that 
unless I tell you a lie, you would come to believe truly that Grey is the murderer. Since 
you could not conceal that belief from Grey, he would then, to protect himself, murder 
you as well.”(Parfit, 2002, p.288) 
 
Here, it seems hard to defend what would be the Kantian position - that one do what one 
ought to do by telling the truth, and that the bad consequences are not one’s 
responsibility. Korsgaard says “it is permissible to lie to a deceiver in order to counter 
the deception.”(Korsgaard 1996b, p. 145) She further refers to what she calls the perfect 
duty of virtue, that one will not for the sake of humanity bee the tool for the devil and 
his evil ends. However, to argue like this requires, according to Korsgaard, a special 
structure of our ethical theory. Korsgaard (Korsgaard 1996b, p.147) claims to be able to 
meet this by unlike Kant allowing for what she calls double-level theories. She follows 
an idea proposed by Rawls, that we may divide moral philosophy into ideal and non-
ideal theories. In an ideal theory everybody is considered to be rational, whereas non-
ideal theories have to deal with conditions where the realization of an ideal is 
impossible. In such situations our aim is not to achieve the impossible, to reach the 
ideal, but rather be concerned with ‘special principles’ with regard to the circumstances. 
To be able to deal with both of these, characterizes double-level theories. Single-level 
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theories cannot distinguish between how we should behave in ideal versus non-ideal 
situations. 
As an example of a single-level theory Korsgaard mentions Kant’s view. To him 
we are always to behave as if we were members of a Kingdom of Ends, this regardless 
of bad consequences such as in the murder case. The main reason to favour double-level 
theories according to Korsgaard is that they can provide us with a common sense 
understanding of responsibility usable for our daily life choices. This allows us to depart 
from our ideals, principles and standards when these are obviously bad. In other words, 
Korsgaard argues for a Kantianism that under some circumstances, allows us not to 
follow the Formula of Humanity and the idea of a Kingdom of Ends, to see them as a 
“goal to seek rather than an ideal to live up to”. (Korsgaard 1996b, p.153) But even this 
I find to be a too strong demand. It also creates problems concerning how we decide at 
which level we should operate and when. How can she claim that we are morally 
obligated, that our moral identity is inescapable, when these kinds of choices are 
something we need to deal with? In what sense are we morally obligated by necessity? 
However, what we cannot ignore she claims is the commands from the Formula of 
Universal Law telling us what we must not under any circumstances do. Hence this law 
must serve as the ultimate source of justification, Korsgaard concludes. I believe this 
can be seen as an argument for yet one vital way Korsgaard’s view appears to depart 
from that of Kant: That rational agency is not always the same as moral agency. But for 
some inexplicable reason Korsgaard apparently does not mean this. So her position 
appears to be incoherent, or at least not very consistent when explaining central 
concepts like rational agency and its relation to moral agency. Incoherence’s possibly 
due to how these different levels relate to each other. By arguing for a double-level 
theory rather than a single-level theory Korsgaard takes one step away from Kant. The 
question is: Is it far enough? 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
Korsgaard’s claim that the categorical imperative is not the Moral Law appears to create 
some challenges. These challenges I find these challenges concern the relation between 
rational agency and moral agency and believe that this uncertainty is due to a confusion 
concerning her view on rationality. By claiming that morality is grounded in human 
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nature, this confusion appears to be to what extent rational nature and human nature is 
to be understood as the same. Intuitively there seems to be a problem with what 
Korsgaard wishes to achieve, namely to somehow combine the views of Hume and 
Kant. For how can one argue for both the necessity Kant associates with moral 
obligations and the categorical imperative and, at the same time, claim that this 
necessity is also captured if one sees human agency and reflection as being the creators 
of morality and of the norms which make claims on us. Who is the author of the laws 
that bind us, and where does necessity come from if we do not ground it in something 
transcending human nature? Do they come from the laws of nature? In the next chapters 
I will explore these concerns further. 
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2.0 Justification and explanation 
In Korsgaard’s arguments from the categorical imperative to the Moral Law, there 
seems to be some common structural features in how she justifies different concepts and 
principles. In this chapter I wish to shed light on these procedural aspects of her position 
and, in particular discuss whether or not these procedures manage to capture the 
necessity she requires from moral obligations and from the categorical imperative.  
First, I will locate Korsgaard’s position in the philosophical landscape as a result of the 
procedural aspects of her thoughts. Then, I will challenge Korsgaard’s view by 
exploring some ideas related to her provided by Rawls and Scanlon.  
 
2.1 Coherence theories 
Justification can be understood as providing good and sufficient reason(s) for having 
certain beliefs and emotions, for making certain claims, for accepting certain principles, 
for making certain judgements, for having certain laws, for holding certain views, and 
for doing certain actions. Thus justified beliefs, actions, emotions, for example, have in 
common with knowledge of some proposition that both rest upon that we have reasons 
such as experience or evidence to support them.  
In the paper “The emergence of justification in ethics” Dagfinn Føllesdal 
outlines the history of justification, focusing on and defending the view commonly 
known as coherentism. I will now use his article as my main source when exploring 
some aspects of the history of justification. Føllesdal writes that Aristotle distinguished 
between three different approaches of justification: linear argumentation from a basis, 
infinite regress and circular argumentation. Aristotle claimed that only moving from 
first principles in a linear manner would provide justification for what we believe to 
know. One of the main challenges to this understanding of justification is to find 
suitable first principles. The two other options, moving backwards into an infinite 
regress and moving in a circle can not provide such justification according to Aristotle. 
In the epistemic case, the problem of infinite regress may arise when we want to justify 
our belief in one claim by the belief of another claim which, again, is in need of 
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justification - and so on. This kind of epistemic regress problem gives rise to the 
sceptical claim that justification is impossible33. 
This problem, in the spirit of Aristotle, can also be expressed more as a 
metaphysical problem occurring if we try to base our knowledge of one matter on the 
knowledge of something else, without being able to trace the process to an 
unconditional starting point. However, a different approach, following the thoughts of 
Plato emerged, based on the idea that we test hypothesises against observations. This 
may be seen as a predecessor of a more circular approach34, an ‘empirical’ approach 
based upon agreement or coherence between the general and the particular, as our 
source of justification. 
Defenders of this view include Middle Age philosophers, such as Thomas 
Aquinas, holding that this approach is best for justification in sciences while Aristotle’s 
method should be restricted to metaphysics. He further argues that neither mathematics 
nor ethics seems to be based upon empirical observation, but rather rests on obvious 
first principles. In 1843, John Stuart Mill opposed this understanding of mathematics, 
claiming that even mathematics is being tested against observations. However, such 
observations opposing any principles of mathematics must be met by a higher degree of 
critical evaluation since changing any principle in mathematics has consequences for 
the rest of the mathematical system. Furthermore, mathematics is already tested to such 
a vast degree in our daily life activities, that one should, according to this view, rather 
question one’s observations than question the principles of mathematics. More recent 
philosophers, such as W. V. Quine, Morton White and Nelson Goodman develop these 
ideas further. In the article ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ Quine says that: 
 
“…total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A 
conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the 
field….Having re-evaluated one statement we must re-evaluate some others, which may 
be statements logically connected with the first or may be statements of logical 
connections themselves…No particular experiences are linked with any particular 
statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations of 
equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.”(Quine 1953, pp.42-43) 
 
                                                 
33 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/ 
34 Føllesdal 2005, “The emergence of justification in ethics”. 
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Thus our beliefs form a system, where the whole system changes if just one of the 
beliefs is being modified. Justification of beliefs is hence a system or holistic project. 
Quine applied this method of equilibrium to science, mathematics and logic. Later on 
the method of equilibrium was also applied in ethics by, among others, Israel Scheffler 
and John Rawls. Both Rawls and Scanlon can be said to use versions of this method in 
their theories of justification. By ‘reflective equilibrium’ Rawls can be understood as 
meaning a method of agreement.  But this is not his only idea of justification. Also his 
idea of a public reason and his derivation of principles in the original position may be 
seen as methods of justification35. (Scanlon p. 139) At first glance it seems plausible 
that Korsgaard’s ideas of reflection and endorsement may be analogous to these ideas of 
agreement, equilibrium and coherence. In order to place Korsgaard’s view on 
justification in this landscape, I will challenge her ideas with the ones of Rawls and 
Scanlon.  
 
2.2 Procedural realism 
Kant, Rawls, Scanlon and Korsgaard are commonly interpreted as constructivists. In the 
essay “Realism and Constructivism in twentieth-century moral philosophy” (Korsgaard 
2003) Korsgaard argues for constructivism explaining the difference between realism 
and constructivism as mainly depending on the perspective which we take. Korsgaard 
concludes her paper by drawing the distinction between realism and constructivism as 
being not about which one is true or right, but as taking different standpoints towards 
practical philosophy. The realist view is taking the theoretical standpoint when looking 
for ethical knowledge in order to apply it to a practical problem. The standpoint of 
constructivism is practical, aimed at solving practical problems. Somehow, Korsgaard 
comes to the conclusion that both realism and constructivism are true, I will now try to 
find out why she thinks this is the case. Where realism is concerned about the nature of 
a concept, constructivism can be understood as taking a concept as dealing with the 
answer to a practical problem.  
She traces the debate back to Hobbes, who according to Korsgaard, did exactly 
this - considered morality as a solution to a problem where the problem in question 
considers how it would be without morality. As a reply to Nagel’s conception of 
                                                 
35 This in accordance with what Scanlon writes in Freeman’s Cambridge Companion to Rawls, p. 139. 
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substantial realism, Korsgaard introduces the distinction of substantial versus 
procedural realism. This distinction is also inspired by Rawls’s distinction between 
proceduralist and substantive conceptions of justice. By procedural realism, Korsgaard 
means that there are right and wrong ways to answer moral questions as opposed to 
substantial realism which she claims is concerned about “moral facts or truths.”36 
Korsgaard’s main argument for procedural realism is that the opposite would mean that 
there are no reasons or ought’s. She continues that the problem with substantial realism 
is because it implies that things have normative properties, that there exist moral 
entities. So in a sense, what there is, is what we construct - a procedure. In this sense 
realism and constructivism is the same. This basic idea seems to be central to 
Korsgaard’s position. The emphasis she places on reflection, as the creator of 
conceptions such as morality and identity, suggests that procedural realism and 
constructivism are defining for her view.  
Others, like Scanlon, may also to some degree support these ideas, but not 
necessarily to the same extent. However, Korsgaard and Scanlon disagree in how deep 
constructivism can go. To Scanlon the notion of being a reason is primitive, which 
means reasons cannot be constructed. He can be viewed as a constructivist with regards 
to moral principles, principles we construct by asking which principles cannot be 
reasonably rejected. That what has normative force on us is not a belief about an 
external world, but rather the procedure forcing our conclusion about what are our 
reasons to have certain attitudes. In this sense he argues in accordance with Korsgaard’s 
idea of procedural realism. Korsgaard takes constructivism further and appears to agree 
with what is commonly considered the Kantian idea that all reasons can be constructed. 
Someone like Rawls, on the other hand, according to Korsgaard37 constructs the 
principle of justice from the original position, while taking the notions of ‘best’ and 
‘good’ as irreducibly normative. Thus an interesting question is then how far should 
constructivism go? I will not try to answer this question, but instead focus on 
Korsgaard’s constructivism exploring my intuition that she goes too far.                                                      
 
2.3 Original position argumentation 
                                                 
36 Korsgaard 1996a, p.35. 
37 Korsgaard in “Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy”. 
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John Rawls’s ‘original position’38, where what is at stake is to make a rational choice 
based upon a certain kind of lack of information or restrictions put on our reasoning, or 
as he puts it – from a wail of ignorance. The idea of a wail of ignorance could be 
interpreted as a standpoint of choice where one is not motivated by any personal 
concerns or knowledge. The original position is an initial one securing a fair 
fundamental agreement. In, a Theory of Justice, Rawls aims to outline a theory of 
justice establishing the idea of fair cooperation involving free, moral and equally worthy 
agents. It is a society where everyone acknowledges the same ideas of what is meant by 
justice, and agrees upon which social institutions best satisfy these principles of justice. 
Hence he argues for a common understanding, or a public reason capable of justifying 
claims about institutions in that society. Rawls does however, not believe in a common 
social conception of what is to be understood as the good. Therefore in developing his 
theory of justice, he cannot derive the concept of right from such a common 
understanding of the good. Hence instead of arguing in a teleological manner, Rawls 
argues in a procedural or original position manner, what is to be considered right is 
what would hypothetically be considered so from the standpoint of the original position. 
This means a sort of reasoning starting from the original position - reasoning based 
upon a certain lack of knowledge. Rawls base his conception of justice upon what he 
calls The Kantian Interpretation of Justice and Fairness, an interpretation of Kant’s 
notion of autonomous action as meaning an action performed by someone with a 
“nature as a free and equal rational being”(Rawls 1999, p.222) Further Rawls argues 
that the principle of justice can be compared to the categorical imperative since both are 
principles for someone due to their nature as free and equal rational beings, and the 
original position can be understood as an interpretation of this virtue.  
 
2.4 Justification of the categorical imperative  
Korsgaard compares the structure of two problems as stated by Rawls and Kant. 
Rawls’s problem is a paradox easily explained if imagining liberal politics in a nation 
                                                 
38 What I write about original position and reflective equilibrium is an interpretation primarily based upon 
reading Rawls a Theory ofJjustice and Scanlon, Rawls on Justification, in Samuel Freeman, 2002a,  ”The 
Cambridge Companion to Rawls”, Samuel Freeman, “Rawls”, and Korsgaard “Reclaiming the History of 
Ethics: Essays for john Rawls”. 
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which is not liberal; where the problem is caused by the central liberal idea that the 
people governed by the politics should also agree to the principles of that politics. 
Rawls’s (and Hobbes’s) solution to this problem is that of justice. 
A similar problem arises when Kant explains the foundation of the categorical 
imperative39. The problem arises due to the definition of a free will as a sort of causality 
which is not itself affected by any external causes, and Kant’s explanation of this 
phenomenon as due to the autonomy of the will – meaning that the will has its own 
laws. But how does the will decide which principles or laws to follow? If the answer to 
this lies outside the will, the will is not free, but if the will does not yet have any laws – 
how can it make any decisions? It seems that there must be some restrictions put on the 
free will. Korsgaard continues to argue that this problem and Rawls problem have the 
same structure in the sense that: 
 
“In both cases what we are looking for is principles themselves, for we need reasons, 
ways of choosing and justifying our actions or our policies, and reasons are derived 
from principles. Yet the very structure of the situation seems to forbid us to choose any 
particular principles.”(Korsgaard 2003, p. 114) 
 
She continues that Rawls’s and Kant’s solutions take similar forms; for Kant the 
solution is the categorical imperative – the law of the free will. The free will is its own 
law, and that is all it is – according to Korsgaard. Thus the categorical imperative does 
not have content, it only tells us to choose: “it must choose as its maxim that it can 
regard as a law”. Rawls’s solution is similarly given in by that his two principles of 
justice describes: 
 
 “what a liberal society must do in order to be a liberal society, just as Kant’s principle 
describes what a free will must do in order to be a free will. Rawls’s principles are 
derived from the idea of liberalism itself, in the same way Kant’s categorical imperative 
is derived from the idea of free volition.”(Korsgaard 2003, p. 115) 
 
Both Kant and Rawls are constructivists, she argues, in the sense that their practical 
concerns are not about getting knowledge to apply in practical situations, but to use 
practical reason to solve practical problems. In a Theory of Justice Korsgaard interprets 
Rawls as distinguishing between the notions of a concept and of conception as where 
                                                 
39 Korsgaard 2003, p. 114. 
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‘concept’ is referring to the solution to the distribution problem and where the 
conception of justice is the solution to this distribution problem. The same structure, she 
continues, is to be found in Kant’s theory. Here the problem is that of freedom: by 
reflecting on that problem one arrives at the solution which is the categorical 
imperative. By reflecting about how a free will must deliberate we arrive at the 
categorical imperative. The free will deliberates by choosing a law for itself. So the 
categorical imperative is constitutive of deliberation and at the same time something we 
arrives at by deliberation. To me this sounds problematic. She continues that the 
categorical imperative is the logic of practical deliberation, much in the same way 
Rawls principles can be viewed as the logic of liberalism. (Korsgaard 2003, p. 115) But 
this I find to be far less problematic for Rawls than it is for Korsgaard since it does not 
give rice to the same kind of circularity as it does for Korsgaard’s argument. Thus, she 
concludes, according to constructivism normative concepts are not names of facts or 
objects in an external world, but names of the solutions to a problem. 
Is this in her view restricted only to relating to moral concepts, since only they 
are about practical problems? She does not answer this question when the concepts as 
stake are those of science, but argues that some more trivial concepts from our daily life 
may also have this structure. Another important aspect of constructivist theories is how 
far they go. As an example Korsgaard mentions Scanlon, who when constructing moral 
principles, wants to solve the problem of justifiability. The question he wants to answer 
is which principles one can reasonably reject. However, as we recall, he stops his 
constructivism here, claiming that the notion of being a reason is primitive, not 
something which we construct. Presenting a special form of contractualism, he argues 
that it is the notions of right and wrong, or of “what we owe to each other”, which is 
most important. The idea of justifiability serves both as a basis for the morality of right 
and wrong, and as a characterization of its content. He addresses the issue of deciding 
between right and wrong as being a matter of finding which reasons or principles no one 
could reasonably reject. 
To Korsgaard constructivism goes a bit further. Reasons are not primitive, but 
are derived from principles she claims. However I find it problematic that deliberation, 
if rational, is to deliberate in accordance with the categorical imperative. How then can 
the categorical imperative be justified by deliberation if it as well is constitutive of 
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deliberation? Practical reasoning should in Korsgaard’s view presuppose the categorical 
imperative. Is it somehow established in a non-rational manner, or is constructivism 
only concerned about our awareness of it, that it is a construction for us, but that it is a 
principle which somehow existed before we had this awareness? But does this not imply 
that what we have is a view not based upon procedural realism as Korsgaard claims? 
 
2.5 Reflective endorsement - the procedure of the categorical 
imperative 
How do we arrive at the original position? The very structure of an original position 
argument is justified by the method of reflective equilibrium. Scanlon suggests that 
when applying Rawls’s method one may proceed as follows: First one identifies, in an 
impartial and fully informed manner, a set of judgements about justice to be adequate 
and correct. Then one tries to formulate principles coherent with these judgements. 
Finally one evaluates whether or not this coherence is successful, and if not, one will 
have to decide which to give up – the principles or the judgements. This moving back 
and forth between principles and judgments continues until there are no more apparent 
conflicts between them. When this is the case, which it never is since it is an ideal state, 
we have reached a ‘reflective equilibrium’. However, this process is Socratic in the 
sense that even though we have a perfect match between our judgements and their 
principles, our knowledge of these principles may want us to continue our search. This 
process is one we do ourselves, from a first person perspective and is, according to 
Scanlon, “a process of deciding what to think, not merely one of describing what we do 
think.”(Freeman 2002a, p. 149). The method of reflective equilibrium is a process 
aiming at making good decisions, even though a perfect choice is not a realistic end 
point. Thus, Scanlon concludes that the main aim of the method is one of deliberation, 
but this is not in conflict with a third person descriptive standpoint. Rather, our ability to 
see the process in both a deliberate and descriptive manner is vital owing to the fact that 
the procedure of ‘reflective equilibrium’ having different stages – benefits from 
different perspectives. Scanlon suggests calling this process “reflective modifications of 
ones reasons”. This reasoning or deliberation arriving at the original position is not 
motivated by an idea of justice; a conception of justice rather emerges by the procedure 
of this deliberation. The process of arriving at the original position may be viewed as a 
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matter of reaching what Rawls refers to as a reflective equilibrium, a consensus in our 
community concerning our judgements about what are reasonable principles of justice. 
This equilibrium between people’s conceptions of what is meant with justice hence 
decides the veil of ignorance as to what is irrelevant for justice. This ignorance ensures 
impartiality despite people making choices based on self-interest. Rawls applies the 
method of reflective equilibrium both in the justification and in the construction of his 
theory40. 
Perhaps it is something similar to this Korsgaard too has in mind, that the 
categorical imperative is something we become aware of through deliberation? 
However, I do find this more problematic than Rawls’s emergence of the idea of justice, 
since it is not as fundamental to the very procedure from which it is being constructed. 
Not only in establishing central concepts of her theory like that of the categorical 
imperative does Korsgaard base her view on deliberation, but also for the more practical 
concern of deciding our reasons for action. Where the agreement in question is what she 
calls endorsement, I assume it can be viewed as some sort of internal agreement. This 
internal agreement I have argued does not secure that these reasons are also reasons for 
others. Where Rawls talk of our nature as free and equal rational beings, Korsgaard does 
as we recall speak of human nature. Her distinction between the Moral Law and the 
categorical imperative (a distinction I cannot see that Rawls makes) requires some extra 
arguments, arguments I have argued don’t necessarily do their job. But I believe 
Korsgaard would disagree because as she says; reflective endorsement is a test for 
normativity, a test all of our inclinations must pass in order for them to be considered 
reasons. Actually, she continues, it is a test for all of our motives and inclinations. The 
normative question is the one of whether our nature is of the good and if we should act 
according to its claims. It is a question asking for the very authorization morality has on 
us. However, she continues, normativity is a problem for us because of our reflective 
nature. We can always question our beliefs and motives: we can question the claims 
normativity makes on us. However, if our moral beliefs and motives sustain the test of 
reflection, what we have found out according to Korsgaard, is not about something else 
such as the existence of alien normative entities, but that this process in itself is 
normativity. In this sense morality is constructed by our reflection. The method of 
                                                 
40According to Scanlon, in Rawls on Justification,  Samuel Freeman, 2002a.  
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reflective endorsement is hence a method which provides a test, the test of reflection 
due to the categorical imperative. Korsgaard takes these ideas as her starting point when 
arguing that the solution to a problem lies in a good formulation of the problem. Thus 
by questioning morality and normativity, we will, by reflection, find that the very 
procedure is the answer to our question. The reflective structure of our mind makes it 
necessary for us to decide between our impulses, we are forced to decide which reasons 
we have to act upon. It is a test not only justifying morality, it is morality itself41. Thus 
in her view, morality is constructed by reflection. Further and related, her conception of 
value has a similar structure.   
 
“Value is grounded in rational nature – in particular in the structure of reflective 
consciousness – and it is projected on to the world.”(Korsgaard 1996b, p.116) 
 
Hence, also value is something we create and, in her view, is not something which we 
find out there. Values are due to the procedure of making laws to yourselves. We create 
value by willing a maxim to be a law, and it is this Korsgaard understands with 
procedural realism – our constructions of values. To will a maxim to be a law requires 
someone who wills it - it must be a reason for someone. This identity is something we 
have by being self-conscious. It is by valuing yourself, that you get a conception of 
yourself. This conception is not a theoretical one, but rather an expression of a practical 
identity: an identity based upon that you value yourself, and find your reasons and your 
life worth having and living. According to Korsgaard, examples of such identities are 
that you are a human, that you belong to a nation and that you are a woman and so on. 
The central point is that these practical identities are something we attain by reflection; 
they are also in a sense procedural. Even moral obligations emerge through reflection. 
That both values, obligations, reasons, our identity and so forth are all constructed by 
similar procedures makes one worry about the danger of becoming self-referential or 
circular. But perhaps the practical identity in question is not the only conception of 
identity that Korsgaard presents? Or does she also operate with a more theoretical, or 
pre-reflective abstract notion of unity or of the self more in accordance with Kant and 
his ‘transcendental unity of apperception’42? A notion of the self which could prevent 
                                                 
41 Korsgaard 1996a, p. 89. 
42 I will refer to this term as used by Allison in “Idealism and Freedom”, “Kant’s theory of freedom” and 
“Kant’s transcendental idealism”. 
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what appears to be a circular view basing al central concepts on a similar procedure? I 
will explore her conception of identity a bit further in order to see if she can meet these 
concerns. 
 
2.6 Personal identity and unity of agency 
In the paper “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit”, 
Korsgaard argues against Derek Parfit’s conception of a person or agency as first of all 
a form of experience. Korsgaard instead advances the idea that we primarily view 
ourselves as agents, as something which we do. Parfit gives an account of what he refers 
to as the standard view of personal identity. This is the view that “the persistence of an 
object over time can be understood in terms of spatiotemporal continuity under a 
concept” (Korsgaard 1996b, p 364) where a person is, or coincides with, exactly such an 
spatiotemporal continuum. But, Korsgaard continues, this view cannot deal with the fact 
that human beings may change radically and hence break this physical continuum, but 
still have what Parfit calls psychological continuity: a continuity expressed by, for 
example our tastes, emotions, characters and memories. With psychological continuity 
Parfit means, according to Korsgard, that there must be some kind of causal connection 
between our psychological states. To obtain this kind of connectedness Parfit considers 
two possibilities: the reductionist view where the conception of a person is reduced to 
something physical “the existence of a brain and body, and the occurrences of a series 
of interrelated physical and mental events”43, or on the other hand the non-reductionist 
view where the continuous subject is a “deep further fact” about someone. He claims 
according to Korsgaard that the important aspect of a reductionist view is not so much 
about the material aspects of a person but rather in how matter is organized. So 
Korsgaard continues, with identity he means something like: 
 
“what we normally count as persisting identity is simply formal continuity plus 
uniqueness-that is, being the only formal continuer of a past self.”(Korsgaard 1996b, p. 
367) 
 
But, what is important is according to this interpretation of Parfit is not our personal 
identity, but what Parfit denotes ““Relation-R” – psychological connectedness and 
                                                 
43 Korsgaard 1996b, p. 368, quoting Derek Parfit 1984, in Reasons and Persons p. 211. 
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continuity” (Korsgaard 1996b, p. 366) The reason why he according to Korsgaard think 
“Relation-R” is more important than personal identity is due to “Relation-R” being 
copiable. What is essential to a person is what can be copied, it’s that persons formal 
aspects. It is not even sure that this relation establishes any connections between a 
person and whoever will occupy his body in the future. Korsgaard argues against this 
idea that we do not necessarily are identical with whom occupies our body in the future. 
She explains that we do not need to give a metaphysical argument for this, since our 
reasons for seeing ourselves as one and the same rational agent over a period of time is 
purely practical. The unified self-conception which Korsgaard has in mind is a practical 
unity, a unity depending on our standpoint of deliberation and choice.  
What is important is to ensure that there are no conflicts among your motives. 
To ensure this and, as well, support the reductionist view, Parfit refers to the example of 
split brains. In short, this is a problem occurring when the nerves between the two 
hemispheres of the brain are cut so that the two hemispheres operate independently. 
This means that one part of the brain can operate without being conscious of the 
activities of another part of the brain. Thus from a metaphysical point of view the two 
hemispheres are no closer related than any two human beings could be. However, since 
there is only one body to perform an action, the two parts will need to come to some 
sort of agreement. 
 
“The unity of consciousness consists in one’s ability to coordinate and integrate 
conscious activities. People with split brains cannot integrate these activities in the same 
way they could before.”(Korsgaard 1996b, p. 376) 
 
In split brain cases Korsgaard argues that all that is needed is some communication 
between the two hemispheres, and in order to communicate one does not need a 
common psychological subject. What is needed is the unity of agency she continues. I 
assume this unity of agency must then be that one of agreement: the agreement reached 
by deliberation and discussion between the two hemispheres, ending in a conclusion on 
how to act. She compares this with the unanimous decision the parties in Rawls’ 
original position must come to. But who is to judge this unity as such? Is it from a third 
person point of view or from a first person point of view? If it is from a first person 
point of view, how can one ensure that it is not only one of the hemispheres who do the 
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job and make the decisions and have the feeling of unity? Her conception of personal 
and practical identity rests heavily upon what she calls a Kantian view: the view that we 
may see ourselves from two different standpoints. This interpretation Korsgaard claims 
to find in Kant’s writings several places and in particular in Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morals. However, this view on unity and personal identity also seems to 
diverge from Kant and his idea of the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’. What Kant 
means by this is widely discussed, a discussion I will not become involved in here. 
However, I do think it is uncontroversial to suggest that by ‘transcendental unity’ Kant 
had in mind a unity as a necessary condition for us to be able to be conscious and to 
have any cognition at all. Korsgaard’s idea of unity seems to be the opposite, that of a 
unity resting on agency and emerging through conscious activities. Although it is 
difficult to see how the transcendental unity can explain split brain cases, so in this 
respect, Korsgaard’s suggestion may be superior. One could also suggest that 
Korsgaard’s idea of a unity of agency can be combined with the idea of a transcendental 
unity, and that the latter is a necessary condition for each hemisphere to deliberate in the 
first place. Hence from this I find one cannot conclude that Korsgaard argues for a view 
dismissing the transcendental aspects of Kant’s philosophy, but only that it is not to 
what she pays attention44. To explore these issues further I will now see what she 
understands with two standpoints. 
 
2.7 Two standpoints and the Modern Scientific World View 
To solve the apparent conflict between freedom and natural laws, Kant introduces the 
distinction between the noumenal (things in themselves) and the phenomenal (things as 
they appear) worlds. Kant’s noumena/phenomena distinction has given rise to several 
interpretations. ‘Transcendental idealism’ is commonly understood as only seeing 
things as they appear to us and not as they are in themselves. This combined with the 
idea of empirical realism is often denoted as a ‘two-world’ theory. Another 
interpretation is the ‘two-aspect’45 account given by Henry E. Allison. His ‘two-aspect’ 
account is based upon his conception transcendental idealism, as argued in his book 
                                                 
44 I will discuss in chapter 4 whether or not some of her arguments from the categorical imperative to the 
Moral Law are transcendental. Her conception of unity of agency is in this respect important. 
45 In ”Two Standpoints and the Belief in Freedom” Dana K. Nelkin describes what she claims to be 
another version of the two aspect account, namely Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism as described in 
“Mental Events”. 
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Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. Allison here argues for a view opposing the standard 
interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism as a metaphysical theory concerned 
whit what is knowable or not. Instead of this he argues that transcendental idealism is a 
view based upon seeing the distinction of noumena/phenomena as distinguishing 
between different aspects of a world rather than dealing with two worlds. 
As a third alternative, Korsgaard argues for the ‘two-standpoint account’, an 
account one of course can question how relates to some versions of transcendental 
idealism46. However this is not what I am about to discuss. Now I will explore what she 
means by a ‘two-standpoint account’, and start with seeing which questions inspired this 
distinction. 
According to Korsgaard, Hobbes and Pufendorf asked how the mechanical 
world of nature could include moral properties This way of questioning is due to the 
fact that they had adopted what she calls ‘The Modern Scientific World View’, that they 
believe it takes something like God or a sovereign to break the order of nature. The 
Modern Scientific World View is the view which according to Korsgaard, is modern in 
the sense that the world is not following the antique idea of world as form, and that 
what is real is what is good. Rather Korsgaard argues47, form is forced onto matter, and 
it is obligation which forces value. According to Korsgaard, Aristotle argues that when 
we seek excellence we do so because it seems attractive to us. Korsgaard opposes this 
and rather follows the Kantian idea of obligation as a compulsory force. She quotes 
Kant and says that “reason – which is form – isn’t in the world, but is something that we 
impose upon it.”(Korsgaard 1996a p. 5) She continues to argue that the idea of 
autonomy as the ethics of obligation is the only one capable of dealing with the modern 
world. The Modern Scientific World View she opposes to the Ancient Greek World 
View and Medieval Christian World View, and so one begins to suspect that the view 
she proposes is not so modern. This suspicion deepens when she advances our challenge 
to our freedom as being determinism. 
I believe by determinism she means in the causal sense as seeing every event as 
caused by a prior event, and that what will happen in the future is fixed because of some 
laws. It was natural for Kant to hold this view living at the time when Newton was the 
authority. However, in science today, thanks to research in several fields, it is highly 
                                                 
46 Related questions will be discussed later in the thesis. 
47 Korsgaard 1996a, p. 4. 
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questionable whether determinism is true. In quantum mechanics, relativistic theories 
and theories concerning singularities such as black holes, the view of determinism is 
challenged. In many scientific fields today the idea of probabilities better explains the 
phenomena investigated than the idea of determinism. However, I will leave this 
discussion, and rather explore further Korsgaard’s view on how to deal with her ideas of 
freedom and how it can be combined with the Modern Scientific World View. Her 
solution echoes Kant by emphasizing the distinction of theoretical and practical 
reasoning, as a distinction between perceiving and doing. She continues to argue that in 
order to make rational choices, we must value what we pursue. Further, we must value 
ourselves, since we choose to do what matters to us: hence a theory of value – by Kant 
stated in his Formula of Humanity – that human beings must be considered as “ends-in-
themselves”. Human beings have value in themselves. Therefore, when making a 
rational choice, we must consider ourselves as citizens in “the Kingdom of Ends”, and 
only act in a way which shows respect for ourselves and other people. We must only act 
in a way that may serve as a universal law. Since it is because we are active we are 
valuable, Korsgaard here argues against the common understanding of Kant’s 
distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal world as a metaphysical or 
ontological distinction, as if we were living in two different worlds simultaneously. 
Rather, Korsgaard suggests an interpretation that there is one world which we perceive 
in two different ways, from two different standpoints. The important distinction 
according to this view is the passive versus active, and not one concerning which world 
is most real. 
By viewing practical reason as an active faculty of mind, one also takes the 
important questions concerning one’s identity not to be metaphysical ones, but rather 
practical. So it is a conception of identity being practical in the sense of being a cause – 
rather than something being caused. And it is due to this that we are free and can be 
held responsible for our actions. Korsgaard, however, claims that some problems we 
have concerning responsibility are due to our failure to acclaim Kant’s radical 
distinction between theoretical and practical reason and their domains of explanation 
versus deliberation. Kant’s distinction between practical and theoretical reason is a 
distinction commonly understood as an ontological or metaphysical one, as a distinction 
concerning what is ‘most real’. Korsgaard suggests another interpretation, arguing that 
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the division of our mental faculties allows us to attain two different perspectives or 
standpoints from which we can relate to our actions. Theoretical reason’s territory is, in 
this view, the phenomenal world – the objects as we experience them – as we passively 
receive them. This is what we may call the world of knowledge or the world of 
scientific explanation. The domain of practical reason is the ‘noumenal’ world – things 
as they are in themselves. Thus, she argues, we have two standpoints allowing us to be 
both deliberate choosers on how to act and, at the same time being capable of giving 
causal explanations of our behaviour. What she calls the Scientific World View is the 
view serving the purpose of predicting and explaining. It is as such the domain of 
knowledge and truth. Korsgaard describes the ‘noumenal’ world as the ethical world, 
the world in which we are active beings and the creator of our thoughts and actions. It is 
in this sense that we have value, as active beings and choosers – as noumena. Hence 
Korsgaard clearly distinguishes the issue of deciding what we ought to do, and to give 
an explanation of why we ought to do something, as a distinction being a matter of 
perspective. When asking for justification of our actions we take the first person 
perspective, focusing on what it is that makes a claim on us we look for support for our 
normative criterions. On the other hand, when wishing to explain why we should do 
something, we do that from a third-person perspective. The first person perspective is 
rather something we construct and not a matter of what we perceive. 
In what way does her view depart from Allison’s ‘two aspect’ view? To Allison 
a rational character has both an intelligible and empirical character. Thus it seems that 
the aspects in question are aspects of rational beings as seen from a third person 
perspective, and not two perspectives as experienced by the person in question which is 
Korsgaarsd’s view. From a first person perspective it must be agreement between the 
two parts of the brain that unifies the agent, not the action. So to me it seems that 
Korsgaard’s argument in the split brain case is problematic, and that what she, in fact, 
argues for is a version of a ‘two aspect’ view and not the ‘two perspective’ view since 
she is dependent on a third person perspective. 
 
2.8 Pre-reflective intuitions48 and the unconditional 
                                                 
48 Inspired by Dagfinn Føllesdal’s  paper “The emergence of justification in ethics”.  
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A common critique of the method of reflective equilibrium according to Scanlon, is the 
one of relativism, that where our process ends is decided by the set of judgements from 
where we started. Scanlon argues against this by saying that the set of judgements from 
where we start our reflections is not a fixed set; this argument does not remove the 
problem completely but it makes it smaller. Another problem is that such a process, by 
the nature of the process, has certain pre-implied ideas in it. How is it possible to talk of 
justification without already accepting the idea of responsibility? If we cannot make 
choices, if we are not responsible - how can we justify anything – then justification is 
not in our powers. The idea of responsibility seems to be presupposed in the very idea 
of justification. Morality may be seen as putting constraints to our rational deliberation 
towards ends.  
Rawls’s idea of ‘reflective equilibrium’ is influenced by Nelson Goodman’s 
‘empirical’ method for testing particular conclusions with general principles commonly 
accepted, and vice versa, testing general principles to particular conclusions commonly 
accepted. Through a process of balanced modifications one arrives at an equilibrium 
providing a justification (at least temporarily) of induction. 
 
“How do we justify a deduction? Plainly by showing that it conforms to the general 
rules of deductive inference.…… But how is the validity of rules to be determined? 
Here again we encounter philosophers who insist that these rules follow from some self-
evident axiom, and others who try to show that the rules are grounded in the very nature 
of the human mind. I think the answer lies much nearer the surface. Principles of 
deductive inference are justified by their conformity with accepted deductive practice. 
Their validity depends upon accordance with the particular deductive inferences we 
actually make and sanction. If a rule yields inacceptable inferences, we drop it as 
invalid. Justification of general rules thus derives from judgments rejecting or accepting 
particular deductive inferences…This looks flagrantly circular. I have said that 
deductive inferences are justified by their conformity to valid general rules, and that the 
general rules are justified by their conformity to valid inferences. But this circle is a 
virtuous one. The point is that rules and particular inferences alike are justified by being 
brought into agreement with each other. A rule is amended if it yields an inference we 
are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to 
amend.”(Goodman 1983, pp. 63-64) 
 
Justification thus does not lie in the rules or in accepted inferences, but rather in the 
equilibrium between them as the source of agreement. Goodman sheds light on an 
important feature of the reflective equilibrium method49, the existence of pre-reflective 
                                                 
49 Føllesdal 2005, p. 177. 
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intuitive acceptances of some statements. The point is that when we use this method we 
do not, at least not at the same time, question all of our judgments. So what is this 
intuitive acceptance? Rawls suggests that one such main source of evidence is 
perception, not only in sciences but also in ethics. Some particular moral judgements are 
privileged in that they serve as evidence for other general ethical principles. This is in 
much the same way as in science where particular observations modify general 
hypotheses. 
The problem of circularity according to this view is not a problem given that one 
accepts some sort of presuppositions, challenging the circle. To Korsgaard what could 
these presuppositions be that should help her to avoid circularity? As we recall she can 
be understood as operating with two kinds of unconditional; the good and rational will 
and the idea of us as reflective conscious beings. It seems that her pre-reflective 
intuition that we are responsible for our action combined with seeing determinism as a 
threat to this quest, have lead Korsgaard to aim for an unnecessary strong foundation of 
the norms binding us. But one problem with these pre-reflective ideas is that they 
cannot be questioned. This makes a vital difference from the reflective equilibrium 
method were all judgments in principle, at some point can be questioned. 
Kant addressed the problem of the free will due to the threats of determinism, 
and he tried to solve the apparent dilemma between determinism and freedom by 
appealing to several dualities. Rawls’ means to have a theory that don’t need to make 
claims of the deep dualisms he means to find in Kant. The method of reflective 
equilibrium is the basis for an empirical theory50, a theory based upon a reflective 
process between our particular observations and our general principles of justice, 
concluding in equilibrium between the two. 
Korsgaard argues for a method having the same structure, but where what one 
seeks is not a theory of justice, but rather to justify the claims normativity makes on us. 
But where Rawls seems to argue for a procedure in which both our general principles 
and our observations are being challenged, for Korsgaard the procedure appears to go 
only one way – reflective endorsement is a test to see whether our reasons are in 
accordance with the categorical imperative. The principles of reason are not to be 
challenged by this procedure, so the methods are not ‘empirical’ in the sense Rawls had 
                                                 
50 Rawls 1999, pp. 226-227. 
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in mind where principles may be adjusted by observations. Hence, Korsgaard offers an 
account arguing for the importance of keeping Kant’s dualities, but at the same time 
argues in accordance with Rawls’s proceduralism when establishing the categorical 
imperative. One problem is whether this is really possible. Similar to Korsgaard and 
Rawls, Scanlon too argues for a method similar to the one of ‘reflective equilibrium’ 
when we justify the reasons we have for doing something. However, unlike the other 
two Scanlon has given up a central duality – the one between theoretical and practical 
reasoning. This means that the domain of responsibility is not as it is for Korsgaard only 
a matter of deciding what we ought to do, it is also a matter of what we ought to believe, 
think and feel – we are responsible for all our attitudes. Korsgaard appears to aim at 
similar ideas: 
 
“Concepts like knowledge, beauty, and meaning, as well as virtue and justice, all have a 
normative dimension, for they tell us what to think, what to like, what to do, and what to 
be. And it is this force of these normative claims – the right of these concepts to give 
laws to us – that we want to understand.”(Korsgaard 1996a, p. 9) 
 
Korsgaard has been criticized for focusing too much on moral normativity, and 
neglecting other forms51. As I read Korsgaard, the reason why she focuses on the moral 
form of normativity is because she finds it to be superior to the other kinds, that other 
kinds of normativity are derived from the normativity in the moral case. But, if it is 
possible to read her view as I do, that we can have rational normativity without having 
moral normativity, would not rational normativity be superior? I also believe she 
encounters problems that Scanlon avoids. If normativity is constructed by a procedure 
of reflection, how can one then get to the normativity of thinking by thinking? To 
accomplish this normativity must have its source somewhere other than from our 
reflections. If she thinks that these norms oblige us, or are forced on us by necessity as 
in the moral case, what is this necessity based on if not on reason in a Kantian sense – 
on human nature and the laws of nature? As an answer to these kinds of concerns 
Korsgaard argues that there is a normative perspective from which morality can be 
questioned.  
 
                                                 
51 Bernard Williams, in “History, Morality, and the Test of Reflection”, Korsgaard 1996a, pp. 210-213. 
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“It is human nature to be governed by morality, and from every point of view, including 
its own, morality earns its right to govern us. We have therefore no reason to reject our 
nature, and can allow it to be a law to us. Human nature, moral government included, is 
therefore normative, and has authority for us.”(Korsgaard 1996a, p. 66) 
 
But is it not the same to say that, yes we can question morality, we can reflect upon it, 
but we are by our very nature forced to come to a conclusion in favour of morality. Is 
this is the essence of reflective endorsement? Then perhaps Korsgaard’s view is better 
understood in light of what she refers to as Hume’s reflexivity test, than a test in 
coherence with Kant’s view? This is a test Korsgaard explains to be when the 
understanding when reflecting on itself and its own procedures ends up in doubts. 
Contrary to this is morality, where reflection on our own moral sentiments makes those 
sentiments stronger. Hence scepticism of the understanding is fine, while scepticism of 
morality is out of place, according to Korsgaard’s reading of Hume, a reading she 
appears to adopt. 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
Where Rawls seems to apply the method of reflective equilibrium both as a foundation 
and as a justification of his theory, Korsgaard appears to take this one step further. To 
her, this method is in addition a method dealing with how we actually operate when we 
are about to make a decision on how to act. Her aim is a very practical one: however, as 
I have argued, this is not unproblematic. How can we establish the normativity of 
reflection by a procedure of reflection, or to establish the very principles of reflection by 
reflection? I suppose Korsgaard would reply to these worries about circularity, by 
referring to the concepts of autonomy and spontaneity: concepts which, if interpreted in 
the air of Kant, could be said to break such circularity. But the question then is, is 
Korsgaard’s conception of these concepts similar enough to Kant’s understanding of 
them to achieve the same thing? Where Kant wanted to establish objectivity, Korsgaard 
takes a different approach wanting to consider in a more objective fashion our 
normative considerations. Again, we are dealing with a procedure, a procedure which, 
again, depends on another procedure. What is valuable, what is our reason to act, what 
is moral, which identity we have – all are a result of a procedure – and since all these 
issues are dependent issues it is hard to see how to avoid problems due to self-reference. 
Kant avoided this by introducing the idea of the transcendental, and it appears difficult 
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to see how to avoid problems of self-reference without in some sense introducing some 
meta perspectives – or at least to base the justification of some of these concepts on 
something ‘outside’ or transcending the individual person. In the last chapter I will take 
a more detailed look at this challenge. But first I will investigate whether or not her 
view of rationality is somewhat similar to Kant’s conception, and to what degree her 
view contains the dualities that Kant is commonly assumed to support. In particular I 
will do this by exploring how she relates emotions to rationality in deliberation, to see 
whether emotions can serve as the needed force for us to be morally obligated.  
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3.0 Deliberation and the dualities of reason 
Since so many of the central ideas in Korsgaard’s view are constructed by the procedure 
of deliberation, in this chapter I will examine some aspects of it further. As we recall, to 
Korsgaard the deliberate process of justification is something we do from a first person 
perspective. Explanations, on the other hand, are according to her, from a third person 
point of view. These perspectives are consequences of a distinct division of our mental 
faculties, the distinction between practical and theoretical reason. Thus reason is 
understood as a standpoint for reflection, where practical reason is concerned about 
what to do and theoretical reason is about explanations, predictions or in what to 
believe. Central in understanding what Korsgaard means by deliberation, is therefore to 
understand what she means by third person and first person perspectives. Internal to the 
procedure of deliberation, there appears to be another division, one between our 
impulses and of our rational activities. One question is if this distinction is essentially 
similar to the division of her perspectives. In order to explore this division I will look in 
more detail at what appears to be a duality in her position, the one between rationality 
and emotions: 
 
 “Part of my intention in invoking the concept of practical identity is to break down 
Kant’s overly harsh, and even in his own terms oversimplified, division between natural 
impulses that do not belong to my proper self and rational impulses that do.”(Korsgaard 
1996a, p.240) 
 
So perhaps she has succeeded in this, to make the dualities of Kant less apparent? 
 
3.1 Korsgaard’s conception of rationality 
Korsgaard argues in accordance with Kant that among our rational capacities is our 
ability to set an end, to decide what a purpose for us to act is. For such a choice among 
our reasons to be rational, our choice must be based upon a lack of interest for that end. 
This is the same as requiring that our choice is not based upon our private reasons, 
inclinations or desires, but in accordance with a categorical imperative. Thus the 
categorical imperative appears to be the principle which we must follow in order to act 
rationally. To Kant this is directly linked to acting morally, since the categorical 
imperative is the Moral Law. But to Korsgaard the situation is different. To get a clear 
 48
understanding of Korsgaard’s conception of rationality is not easy, as I find it often to 
be implicit in her writings, so to give an account would be speculative. Therefore I will 
restrict myself to a short outline. 
Sometimes she gives the impression of sharing the conception of rationality with 
that associated with Kant, at other times she argues in ways which appears to be 
incoherent with the very same ideas. Central to what she argues to agree with Kant, in is 
that the principles of practical reasoning spring from the rational nature of the will, and 
that such reasoning conclude with what we ought to do. 
In the previous chapter I established that there is a problem concerning the 
justification of the categorical imperative, and about how Korsaard argues that it should 
have such a strong demand on us. In this chapter I will see whether related concerns can 
be established with regards to our deliberations. Korsgaard claims that to be able to 
account for the reasons which move us is characteristic of rational agency. In this view, 
our reflective capacities, our capability to be aware of our own reasons, is what 
distinguishes us from other living creatures. Thus when we act, how do we decide what 
to do? How do we know which reasons we have for acting in certain ways, and how do 
we choose between these reasons? To answer these questions Korsgaard presents a view 
relying heavily on Kant and his idea of an unconditional starting point, the idea that the 
only thing which is unconditionally valuable is a good – or rational - will. Thus to be 
rational consists of responding correctly to reasons, but being a reason is not primitive. 
According to Korsgard our reasons needs to be in accordance with our rational 
principles. From a practical point of view, according to Korsgaard, to have reasons 
means to have reflective success. When we decide that something is a reason to act on, 
that is a decision we have reached by reflection. It is a reflection consisting of 
distancing ourselves from our inclinations and questioning them. Thus what dominate 
deliberation are our rational principles and not our desires or emotions and in this sense 
her understanding of deliberation has more in common with her understanding of 
Hume’s conception of justification than of Kant’s view on reflection. As we recall, 
Korsgaard explained that to Hume justification emerged from of us adopting both the 
theoretical and the practical perspectives. Perhaps this inspired Korsgaard’s idea of the 
justification of deliberation as somehow internally to take different perspectives? 
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With reflection she seems to refer to a kind of reasoning, one based upon certain 
rules of logic and with the categorical imperative as its principle, I assume. This 
reasoning is supposed to be completely free from one’s inclinations. How is this 
possible? Even the simplest mathematical reasoning, with a limited set of axioms and 
rules gives rise to situations of choice - situations where there are several, and 
sometimes equally good ways to come to an end. So how are choices of this kind to be 
made? At random, spontaneously or perhaps determined? Or does this kind of reasoning 
require some additional motivational force, such as emotions? The reflections 
Korsgaard has in mind I presume to be of an even more complex kind than simple 
mathematics, and as such constantly give rise to situations of choice. But if one assumes 
that emotions are necessary for this kind of reflection or procedure to proceed, this too 
gives rice to some problems. Since then what we have is in a sense a new situation of 
deliberation internal to the original procedure, which again would require an internal 
procedure and so on. It seems that this would lead to an infinite regress so there must be 
some other alternatives. 
One such alternative she points at is to consider one self as another ‘I’. What 
does this mean? To consider oneself as another ‘I‘ owing to a small difference of time? 
This I presume is not an option open to her since, as we recall, our conception of 
identity is emerging in time and is not something which we have at a particular moment. 
Perhaps then, this other ‘I’ is meant in the sense of being as if I was another I. However 
then one can ask, what is the difference between this other ‘I’ and a third person? 
Perhaps is it just a way of taking the third person perspective, to view ones own 
inclinations objectively. In that case the deliberate perspective becomes very close to 
the perspective of explanation.  
 
3.2 Scepticism about practical reason 
In “Scepticism About Practical Reason”52 Korsgaard argues against doubts concerning 
whether reason can serve as a guide on how to act. She divides the question into two: 
one is concerning motivational scepticism – whether reason can motivate us; the other 
form of scepticism she refers to as content scepticism - doubts concerning our principles 
                                                 
52 Korsgaard 1996a. 
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of thought and to what extent they have content capable of helping us in situations of 
choice and action. Scepticism about practical reason is stated by Hume as following: 
 
“Reason is, an ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any 
other office than to serve and obey them.”53 
 
What Hume may appear to say is that all reasoning with a motivational force must have 
started with a passion? Korsgaard argues that if reason plays this limited part, reason 
cannot decide if our passions and desires are rational or not, then actually there is no 
way these passions can be rational or irrational. The challenge Kosgaard is then facing 
is that if one argues as she does, that practical reason may reach conclusions not in any 
way depending on passions, how can such an operation end up motivating us? Or put 
differently, can an emotion arise from anything other than an emotion? 
To be able to state this problem more clearly, Korsgaard refers to a more recent 
discussion as stated by Thomas Nagel. He distinguishes between moral theories as 
being ‘internalist’ or ‘externalist’. According to an internalist theory, if one has 
knowledge of a moral judgment, it implies a motive or a reason to act on that 
judgement. According to the externalist view, such a dependence on knowledge and 
motivation is not necessary. If something is to be considered a reason claim, a claim 
about which reasons we have to act, it must according to Korsgaard be capable of 
motivating. This is what she refers to as the internalism requirement54. 
Korsgaard concludes her argumentation against scepticism about practical 
reason that it may be due to a misunderstanding of what the internalism requirement 
requires, namely that we are always motivated by rational considerations. This is too 
strong a claim; all we need according to Korsgaard is that we are motivated insofar as 
we are rational. Hence we can allow for some irrationality, and at the same time hold 
that practical reasoning is instrumental. To be a reason is not the same as always being 
able to motivate just anyone, all it takes to be a reason is that it can motivate a rational 
person55.  
 
3.3 Reasoning and emotions 
                                                 
53 Korsgaard quoting Hume, Korsgaard 1996b, p. 312. 
54 Korsgaard 1996b, p. 317. 
55 Korsgaard 1996b, p. 321. 
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By claiming that the categorical imperative is different from the Moral Law, I find that 
Koragaard paves the way for the possibility of acting in according with the categorical 
imperative, without acting in accordance with the Moral Law. Thus in the case of 
egoism, where an action may be rational but not necessarily moral, could this be the 
case? Can the egoist perhaps have the categorical imperative as their acting principle 
and as such can be rational, and is as such perhaps not completely determined by the 
laws of nature? To save the egoist from being completely determined by the causalities 
of nature, I guess requires that the categorical imperative can have a hold on us 
independently of whether or not there is any moral content. But how can such an 
imperative motivate us if moral emotions are not on stake? Thus is our reasoning or our 
reflection, or the rational aspects of such, completely separated from emotions in 
Korsgaard’s view? Or is it possible, or even necessary to see emotions and reasoning as 
equal aspects, or perhaps perspectives of the same process or procedure? 
Kant introduced the emotion of respect as the driving force behind the 
categorical imperative; the question then arise is this also an option for Korsgaard’s 
view or does she need to find the motivational source of the categorical imperative 
elsewhere? According to Korsgaard, Kant takes as a starting point that what is 
unconditionally valuable is the good will, being valuable independent of its 
consequences. An action is valuable because of the grounds that determine it, not due to 
its purposes. 
Korsgaard explains three different kinds of motivation that Kant advances; to act 
from duty (from what is the right thing to do), to act from enjoyment (direct inclination) 
or to act from indirect inclination (as a means to an end). Only to act from duty has 
moral worth, since duty may be said to be the good will with some restrictions, and so 
only by being motivated by duty does one act rationally. Hence an act from duty gets its 
value from maxims “subjective principles of volition”56. (Korsgaard 1996b, p. 57) A 
maxim may be seen as a reason for action, a reason expressing understanding of a 
principle or law. But how is this unified with the ideas of autonomy and freedom? 
Korsgaard argues that in deliberation and choice Kant uses the notions of autonomy and 
freedom as something which we as rational beings attribute to ourselves, as a way to 
view our reasons or maxims for our actions. When we are engaged in choice for action, 
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we do not consider ourselves as determined by anything, or forced into it by any desire. 
Rather, we see ourselves as acting from principles which we adopt freely; it is this 
voluntary adoption of principles which entails the idea of an obligation. Thus to be 
obliged does not contrast with our self-perception as free. This does not mean that one 
cannot take a desire to be a reason to act; it only means that you are not forced to act 
because of this desire – it is a choice.  We are dealing with a hypothetical imperative – a 
principle telling us what we ought to do to attain an end – in this case, that by following 
our desire we would come to an end. To be considered a rational maxim to act from, a 
hypothetical imperative must pass certain tests. It must be a means to your end and 
“(unless it is morally required) your end must be consistent with your happiness.” 
(Korsgaard 1996b, p. 14) If Korsgaard agrees in this, I guess she must also agree of the 
possibility of rational actions that are not moral actions. Rational in the sense of being a 
maxim which can meet the test of hypothetical or categorical imperatives. In the case of 
obligation, however, this is not so, that one morally ought to do something expresses 
necessity to do an action. Moral ought is expressed by a categorical imperative, telling 
us what to do independently of our private purposes, subjective reasons or desires. But 
why should this exclude the possibility of a rational ought, an ought not necessarily 
moral but still expressed by a categorical imperative? But Korsgaard continues 
supporting Kant’s view that morality is grounded in the human will, and the good will is 
the source of value.  
 
“There are two ways of being motivated, autonomously and heteronomously. When you 
are motivated autonomously, you act on a law that you give to yourself; when you act 
heteronomously, the law is imposed on you by means of a sanction – you are provided 
with an interest in acting on it.”(Korsgaard 1996b, p. 22) 
 
Thus a will is according to Korsgaard free due to it not being influenced by any external 
force, including desires. At the same time though, it is causality and hence must have a 
law. This law cannot be imposed from the outside, and must therefore be chosen by 
oneself – and it is in this sense we are autonomous. But one concern I have with regard 
to Korsgaard’s view on autonomy is that this choice appears to be what she claims it is 
not – causal. Not causal meaning determined by powers outside us, but rather 
determined from within. Her conception of a self not transcending human nature 
appears to imply that we are forced by our own nature to make the choice the way we 
 53
do. This again it is hard to see how she can combine with her conception of freedom 
and responsibility. Does this mean that Korsgaard’s view on autonomy is rather 
heteronomous? To this I believe Korsgaard’s answer is no. By heteronomous 
motivation Korsgaard means something optional, since we can chose to change our 
interests. Autonomous motivation on the other hand is compulsory. But what role do 
our emotions serve for our motivations? 
According to Korsgaard our emotions may serve as an important contributor to 
our motivations, but then in a heteronomous sense. Korsgaard believes that to act from 
inclination is like to act based on emotions, or to act instrumentally as a means to an 
end. Only by being autonomously motivated is an act moral, duty obligates us 
unconditionally, and only a categorical imperative can manage this. Does this mean that 
Korsgaard thinks that emotions cannot play a rational or moral role? We have according 
to Korsgaard, negative moral emotions such as guilt and regret, as a way of punishing 
ourselves when failing to act from duty. However this punishment or pain is not a threat 
to our authority over our minds, it only states that since pain is perception of a reason57 
(both in a backward and forward looking manner), we are capable of experiencing them. 
Now I will explore one emotion to which Korsgaard pays attention (in a footnote58) as 
possibly having some cognitive aspects – namely respect. The moral emotions of 
respect are our awareness of the mental activity of a moral reason, an awareness having 
the character of a feeling. But this means that our emotions come late, and that we have 
our moral norms, and reasons independently of our feelings. In this view emotions play 
a role in our rationality, but a very small one. Moral emotion is not the source of moral 
reason it only perceives it in her view. Respect may be seen as the emotion of taking an 
interest in and motivate us to take other rational beings into consideration, hence it is 
natural to assume it pays a role related to the process of the categorical imperative. In 
this sense it may be said to be rational, and perhaps ensure tat we are not “slaves of 
passion”. So this may be the solution to the problem concerning how the commands of 
the categorical imperative motivate us, to why we should follow it. The answer to this 
as given by the Formula of Humanity is based upon the idea of mutual respect, to 
consider other rational beings as ends and not as means. Thus the categorical imperative 
will, according to this interpretation, have a hold on us due to an underlying emotion or 
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idea of respect for other human beings59. Respect can be viewed as an autonomous 
motive60 as well as an emotion. This however requires that one equates being 
autonomously motivated with being morally motivated. So by linking respect for the 
categorical imperative with respect for other people, this could be an argument 
supporting what appears to be Korsgaard’s view - that rational agency always are moral 
agency. This implies that respect is the only autonomous motive, where autonomy can 
be understood as a kind of freedom restricted to moral activities. But I don’t think this 
tells the whole story. I see no good reasons why one can’t similarly claim that self 
respect could count as being an autonomous motive. Self respect as meaning respect for 
the categorical imperative combined with the view that the categorical imperative is not 
solely a moral imperative but first of all a rational imperative. So the emotion of respect 
as a motivational force is not in my opinion an argument supporting Korsgaard’s and 
Kant’s view that that rational agency is moral agency. I neither find that the emotion of 
respect can solve the problem of motivation for Korsgaard. Even though she claims to 
support the Kantian idea of respect as a leading motivational force, her view of 
emotions belonging to our passive rather than active perspective makes it hard to se 
how this can be. Rather, Korsgaard interprets Kant in such a way as to make the gap 
between emotions and our rational capacities larger than would be the case of a ‘two 
world’ interpretation. In the ‘two world’ view, an emotion perceiving a reason would by 
that very act have rational content. But to Korsgaard active versus passive is the 
essential distinction, and no emotion whatever it perceives could I guess in her view is 
anything but passive. 
How can Korsgaard claim that because emotions are perceptions of our reasons 
“then emotions must play an essential role in moral life even on the most rationalistic 
theory.” (Korsgaard 1996a, p. 151) Her view does not seem to allow for motivation to 
be emotionally driven, but only to have them as its consequence, so I cannot really see 
which important role she has in mind. Hence the Kantian idea of emotions which 
Korsgaard appears to support, as a passive, perceptual, perceiving issue leaves them in a 
different domain to deliberation which is something we actively do. So from that 
perspective it seems that emotions cannot by nature have rational content, and that she 
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60 Carla Bagnoli discusses this issue in  “Respect and Membership in the Moral Community”. 
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needs to find other motivational forces than the emotion of respect, or any other 
emotions, if she wants to avoid Hume’s concern that we are slaves of our passions. 
Korsgaard mentions desires, inclinations and respect for the moral law as what 
presents us with our options for what to choose as reasons. So incentives define our 
domain for what we take an interest in so to consider something as a possible reason 
could be said as equalling taking an interest in it. Further, Korsgaard argues that “Kant 
claims that it is impossible for a human being not to be moved at all by incentives; our 
freedom, rather, is exercised in choosing the order of precedence among the different 
kinds of incentives to which we are subject.”(Korsgaard 1996b, p.165) According to 
Korsgaard, this is what makes us imperfectly rational beings. If we follow what she 
refers to as Kant’s ‘Argument from Spontaneity’ the Moral Law would be the first 
principle of a pure rational will, and the categorical imperative the law of spontaneity. 
But why should we choose the moral maxim over the maxim of self love? In order to 
understand this let us first take a look at how Korsgaard understand Kant’s distinction: 
 
“The maxim of self-love says something like: 
 
I will do what I desire, and what is morally required if it doesn’t interfere with my self-
love. 
 
And the moral maxim says something like: 
 
I will do what is morally required, and what I desire if it doesn’t interfere with my 
duty.”(Korsgaard 1996b, p. 165) 
 
This seems to be the same distinction as we were dealing with when distinguishing 
between the egoist and the moral person. But what is it that makes us take an interest in 
other people why do we find morality important? According to Korsgaard, what we 
need is an incentive to “identify with the free and rational side of our nature”. She 
continues that this is why Kant made the ‘two-world’ distinction. This is a distinction 
situating inclinations in the world of phenomena, making the inclination of self-love a 
deterministic and naturalistic option. Thus acting from self love is not an act governed 
by the free will. In this respect, Korsgaard’s ‘two standpoints’ view may be said to 
make the gap between the person acting from self-love and the moral agent less than 
Kant. For her to act from self-love I guess would be to act according to a third personal 
perspective. But if self-love is a naturalistic option why is not also respect so? I believe 
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this question is difficult for Korsgaard to answer, and I believe the answer has to be that 
also respect is passive and as such do not belong as an aspect of our moral or rational 
reasoning’s. If she were to claim otherwise I believe she would have to loosen up on her 
conception of the dualities of reason. Perhaps another way out of it is if her conception 
of human nature could entail some ideas of virtues. 
One intuitively appealing idea I find, is that motivation for action, also in a 
rational sense, is intimately connected with the emotion of taking an interest in 
something. Korsgaard acclaims Kant’s view that all actions must have an end, and that 
each choice is determined by such an end. To adapt a moral end is, in this view, a virtue. 
There are several moral ends and hence several virtues all in accordance with the 
Supreme Principle of the Doctrine of Virtue: 
 
“Act according to a maxim whose ends are such that there can be a universal law that 
everyone have these ends”61 (Korsgaard 1996b, p. 178) 
 
 
This principle allows for what she calls internal freedom, freedom in the form of the 
virtue of internalizing moral ends. All virtues represent a duty, an obligation to act 
according to the Moral Law. But in what sense do we then talk of freedom if it means 
obeying a law? To answer this Korsgaard quotes Kant as saying that we are free to 
construct our own ends in the sense that no one else can force an end upon us; it is 
entirely up to us which ends we adopt – and this is what Kant means by internal 
freedom. When adopting an end, given that it is a moral end, we take pleasure in it. But 
that we take pleasure in adopting an end does not mean that achieving pleasure 
motivated us, since only to act from duty has moral worth and can move us to act in a 
rational way. Thus Korsgaard distinguishes between the emotions which make us adopt 
a purpose and those resulting from adopting a purpose62. To act rationally means to act 
independently of our own inclinations, this means not to act according to our own 
interests like those which are emotionally based. But how can Korsgaard claim that she 
wants to make Kant’s harsh division of our faculties smaller, when she in many respects 
appears to do the opposite? One way out of this for Korsgaard could be to push Kant’s 
theory of virtue in an Aristotelian direction and by that attribute to emotions some 
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rational impact. There is a new interest in Kant’s view on virtues. Nancy Sherman 
writes in the book Making a Necessity of Virtue, Aristotle and Kant on Virtue that in 
 
“The Doctrine of Virtue, Kant recognizes the duty to develop emotions as part of our 
duties of virtue…. our end-setting capacities (i.e., rational agency) are sustained and 
developed” (Sherman 1997, p. 125) 
 
Hence her point is that emotions as part of our human nature will have an impact on 
morality due to it being grounded in human nature. Therefore it is our duty to develop 
these emotions in order to improve our rational agency and end setting capabilities. 
These ideas go well with Korsgaard’s ideas of human agency as the source of 
normativity, and her more practical approach to rational agency than the ideal view 
Kant supports. However I cannot see that it harmonizes with the Kantian idea of rational 
nature. 
 
“Practical reason is a faculty of ends, so if there is pure practical reason there must be 
necessary ends. This means that there are duties to have these ends, duties of 
virtue.”63(Korsgaard 1996b, p. 20) 
 
Humanity is the end set by reason, but to accomplish virtue these ends must be achieved 
freely. How successful one is concerning these virtues depends upon whether one 
manages to carry out in the duties of virtue from a moral motive or not. We are anyway 
obliged to try, even though perfection is not realistic she concludes.  
 
3.4 Naturalism and the nature of the self 
Korsgaard’s conception of identity is to me unclear. She operates with the idea of a 
practical identity, which is an identity we construct – an identity emerging through 
action or reflection. But is this the only conception she has of a self? When describing 
the procedure of reflective endorsement, it is a procedure of distancing ourselves from 
our inclinations. She say that there is an ‘I’ as if it is over and above ourselves, an ‘I’ 
making it possible for me to reflect upon my own thoughts. How is this ‘I’ to be 
understood? What she refers to I understand to be that the ‘I’ is our self-consciousness, 
                                                 
63 Korsgaard quoting Kant.  
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our awareness of our own mental activities. If so, what does it imply – that she supports 
some kind of naturalism? 
In “On Naturalizing Kant’s Transcendental Psychology”64 Allison argues against 
interpretations of Kant naturalizing his conception of ‘a self’. With ‘naturalizing’ 
Allison appears to mean something similar to having a causal or functionalistic account 
of representations of objects, giving rise to an understanding of the self as being 
empirical. Empirical in the sense, that a synthesis is understood as a conscious act 
combining elements from one cognitive state to create a new one65. Thus cognitive 
mental states that are connected synthetically are so in a causal manner. The 
‘transcendental unity of apperception’ is, in this view, exactly such a synthesis giving 
rise to new cognition. This does sound as being close to how Korsgaard may be read. 
This is in contrast to the view which I assume Allison holds that this unity of 
apperception is the starting point of the transcendental deduction. He interprets Kant as 
with identity or unity meaning a necessary condition for cognition, an identity we think 
a priori, and not something which one is aware of or identifies oneself with – rather it is 
fundamental for us being aware. 
 
“In short, conceptual recognition (which is what the objectivating synthesis amounts to 
for Kant) is an inherently reflexive and, therefore, self-conscious act. I cannot perform it 
without an awareness of what I am doing (a consciousness of the act), although I can 
certainly do it without reflecting that I (Henry Allison) am doing it.”(Allison 1996, p. 
62) 
 
This idea of an ‘I’, is based on the idea of the self as not being an object to which one 
can have cognition either in a sensible or an intellectual way. This is in contrast with 
how I understand Korsgaard’s view of identity, as something emerging exactly through 
deliberation. It is by distancing oneself from one’s inclinations, by reflection, meaning 
seeing central aspects of oneself from a distance one comes to have an identity. Hence 
the naturalistic view as given here seems to have more in common with how I 
understand Korsgaard’s view than Allison’s Kant-based view. I will now see in what 
sense she herself may consider her view to be naturalistic. 
 
                                                 
64 Allison, Idealism and Freedom, pp. 53-66. 
65 From Kitchers formal def. of a synthesis, Allison, Idealism and freedom, p. 54. 
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“In one sense, the account of obligation which I have given in these lectures is 
naturalistic. It grounds normativity in certain natural – that is, psychological and 
biological – facts. I have traced the normativity of obligation to the fact of reflective 
consciousness and the apparent normativity of pain to the fact of simple consciousness, 
together with the nature of an animal. My account does not depend on the existence of 
supernatural beings or non-natural facts, and it is consistent with although not part of 
the Scientific World View. In that sense, it is a form of naturalism. But in another sense 
it is not. In another sense, a naturalistic view identifies normative truth with factual 
truth.”(Korsgaard 1996a, p. 160) 
 
It is very difficult to read this in any way than that she grounds normativity in the 
empirical, in psychology and biology. But from where then could necessity of 
obligation arise, if not from the laws of nature?  To this she claims that it only needs to 
be consistent with the scientific world view, it is not a part of it. So what is it a part of? 
At least the causalities of reflection must be of a very strong kind, as though being laws 
of nature. In several places in her text she points to passages in Kant saying something 
like this, so I presume this is how she likes to interpret his view. It is a view focusing 
more on human nature than on rational nature, and in this sense she seems closer to 
Hume than Kant in this respect. However, a problem with this view of reflection is that 
it is difficult to argue that our thinking is not determined. Therefore, are there any other 
options than an ‘I’ understood as a ‘transcendental unity of apperception’ or an ‘I’ 
threatened by naturalism? If so, is this a conception of an ‘I’ which is available to 
Korsgaard. I will now explore these matters. 
Korsgaard’s view of the first person perspective rests upon a division between 
our incentives and on our more rational capabilities. It is by distancing oneself from 
impulses such as our emotions that we are capable of making rational decisions. Thus 
deliberation or first person perspective is in this sense somewhat dualistic or divided. 
What is commonly characterized as the standard view of rationality holds that 
rationality can be reduced to the notions of desires and beliefs. This means that acting 
rationally implies acting in accordance with certain beliefs and desires. Korsgaard has a 
different view holding that desires play a different role. The very fact that you don’t just 
wait to see which desire becomes a reason, you actively choose between your 
conflicting desires by having reasons for or against them. These reasons and not your 
desires are expressions of your will, Korsgaard explains. (Korsgaard 1996, p. 370) Thus 
to act on a desire requires that one finds oneself to have a reason to do so - rationality is 
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about responding to reasons. However, for Korsgaard it does not end here, which 
reasons we have is a matter of being in coherence with the principles of reason. 
One who also opposes the standard view of rationality is Scanlon. But to him the 
notion of being a reason is primitive. Desires in the standard interpretation according to 
Scanlon, are psychological states serving both as motivating actions and as initiating 
justifications. However, Scanlon disagrees in giving desires this crucial role, arguing 
that the notion of being a reason better serves these purposes. This is not the same as 
saying that recognizing something as a reason motivates us. Scanlon disagrees in the 
very idea held by the standard conception that we should have some sort of motivational 
state of mind in addition to the considerations we make concerning which reasons we 
have. If someone is rational and finds something to be a reason to act, it explains that 
person’s intentions and actions according to those reasons. However this is not the same 
as saying that a person is motivated by recognizing something as a reason to act. 
According to Scanlon we do not need some external (to our considerations) 
motivational state, it is sufficient with the state of mind we are in (our attitude) when 
making the consideration that something is a reason. Hence our desires have a cognitive 
aspect when being involved in seeing something as a reason. These attitudes are in a 
sense desires; the crucial point being that these desires do, not imply an additional 
mental state different from the state from which we make our considerations. ‘the 
language of reasons, as opposed to mere desires, is crucial to an adequate description of 
the structure of our own practical reasoning and also to our relations with 
others’.(Scanlon 2000,  p. 77). Scanlon links the concepts of desires and the structural 
features of our reasoning together, rather than seeing them as separate issues. He argues 
for a strategy or method for evaluating our judgements about which reasons we have. In 
the moral case deciding what to do is to see which reasons one cannot reasonably reject. 
One of his main arguments for this view is that in dealing with moral issues one is more 
concerned about reasonableness rationality. It can also be argued to provide a more 
realistic and practical procedure in decision making, than the seemingly hopeless project 
of identifying all of one’s reasons and then deciding which one is the best. Thus in a 
sense he presents an account which is more practical than that of Korsgaard. More 
importantly though he has a view of deliberation that does not rest on the duality that 
Korsgaard’s view does. I find that one central idea that Alison and Scanlon seems to 
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share is the idea of first person perspective as something one is in rather than something 
one is being self-conscious about. This is, I suppose, is what one more frequently 
considers as a first person perspective. Korsgaard’s first person perspective is divided, 
and as such gives rise to several problems in my opinion. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
I have argued that I am not convinced that Korsgaard achieves her aim of softening 
Kant’s dualisms. Her view of the process of deliberation I find problematic. To step 
back from one’s inclinations means to put behind all our practical identities except the 
one we all have in common - that we are a human beings. If this is the case for everyone 
deliberating, what then is the difference in doing this and from taking the third person 
perspective of oneself – or as I guess Korsgaard would put it – the perspective of 
another self? If in deliberation one takes away every emotion or inclination, everything 
which is peculiar to that person, what then is the difference between another self and a 
third person?  I cannot see that Korsgaard gives an answer to this. However, if we then 
accept that deliberating is to step back and reflect about our inclinations as if we were 
someone else, does this not then make it very close to the theoretical perspective of 
explanation? Then her two standpoints’ appears to collapse into one. 
I find that the main problem is due to Korsgaard’s demand to our reasoning as 
being causal in the sense of as if being a part of nature. This demand is unnecessary 
strong and makes the dualities of reason harsher than for Kant rather than the opposite. 
And it makes one question why should the fact that we are the source of the law which 
binds us necessarily lead to freedom and responsibility? The conception Korsgaard 
presents of ‘the self ‘does not obviously provide a support to this view. Then the less 
introspective conceptions of ‘the self’ as provided by Scanlon and Allison, for very 
different reasons, may be better candidates to meet the quest for responsibility. But 
perhaps doesn’t the interpretation of Korsgaard as defending some sort of naturalism 
tell the whole or true story? In the next chapter I will explore if the necessity she 
associates to our moral obligations can be justified by transcendental arguments instead 
of resting on causality.  
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4.0 Autonomy and freedom 
Why should the fact that we are the source of the law which binds us necessarily lead to 
freedom and responsibility? Korsgard’s arguments give rice to confusion of whether 
autonomous agency equals moral agency, rational agency, both or neither. In this 
chapter I will try to explore these concerns further. 
Korsgaard’s division of the categorical imperative from the Moral Law appears 
to create problems of justifying both the categorical imperative and the Moral Law. The 
categorical imperative, as constructively justified, gives rise to self-referential problems, 
while the force of moral obligations can be questioned as well. Perhaps the problem is 
due to different expectations about what a law is? So, what is a law? For Korsgaard, to 
answer this question is vital to understanding similarities and differences between her 
and Kant’s position. One reason for this is because they both argue that the categorical 
imperative requires that what we accept as a reason to act, must take the form of a law. 
To count as a law in their sense, is both owing to the judgements’ universality and to 
their necessity66. However, as I have argued, their idea of what is meant by universal is 
not obviously the same. The difference is possibly due to how they argue and, in 
particular, due to in whether their arguments are transcendental or not. On the other 
hand their conception of necessity seems to be rather similar, at least in claiming to have 
the same force. This, I presume, is due to their apparent common conception of the 
relationship between freedom and law, and in how this conception is supposed to 
balance the determinism they associate with the world of nature. In this chapter I will 
explore further these possible differences and similarities. One important question is in 
what sense, or if at all, Korsgaard’s arguments from the categorical imperative to the 
Moral Law can be said to be transcendental. If so, then perhaps the necessity of moral 
obligations is secured, as well as the idea of our moral identity as inescapable? 
 
4.1 Transcendental argumentation 
So what is meant by transcendental argumentation? A transcendental argument is 
commonly understood as an a priori argument, an argument independent of experience. 
Synthetic a priori judgements or transcendental judgements have their status as a priori 
                                                 
66 Theo van Willigenburg argues in a similar manner in ‘Shareability and Actual Sharing: Korsgaard’s 
Position on the Publicity of Reason’ p. 174. 
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by necessity because they have their source in the ‘transcendental unity of 
apperception’, a kind of ego which serves as a necessary condition for our self-
consciousness. It is a condition of knowledge, but since it is not an object of knowledge 
we cannot know anything about it. If one interprets this ego as having universal force, it 
could be seen as what limits our freedom to also concern others. Kant argues, according 
to Allison,67 that practical freedom and transcendental freedom are dependent issues, 
where we do not have the latter without having the former. Transcendental freedom is 
what Kant's Third Antinomy concerns, based upon our ability to initiate a state entirely 
from ourselves – or spontaneously. Transcendental freedom is what Kant denotes as a 
‘pure transcendental Idea’ or concepts of reason, meaning something independent of 
any object given in experience. Transcendental freedom is contrasted with mechanical 
causality and determinism underlying any kind of time order. Practical freedom, on the 
other hand, concerns human agency and our ability to recognize something as being a 
reason, a freedom depending upon the pure transcendental Idea. Transcendental 
arguments are commonly traced back to Kant68 as an argument against epistemic 
scepticism. The notion of a ‘transcendental argument’ is not commonly understood as a 
proof, but rather as a looser form of justification. One of the things Kant wanted to 
demonstrate by a transcendental argument was that we cannot have experience without 
the existence of time and space. This was meant as an argument to the sceptic of the 
existence of things outside us. In general, a transcendental argument has the following 
structure69: one wants to show that a judgement is true, and the task is to find other 
judgements which are necessary conditions for this judgement to be true. 
Transcendental arguments are commonly used to argue against scepticism by showing 
that scepticism is incoherent or inconsistent. This is done by depending upon 
unquestionable, unavoidable conceptions of thoughts, experience or language. 
Commonly such an argument takes as a starting point some presuppositions or concepts 
which are necessary in order for the sceptic to pose their challenge, and then goes on to 
show that these very presuppositions dismiss the challenge. A modern example of a 
transcendental argument is given by Hilary Putnam, arguing that we are not ‘brains-in-
                                                 
67 Henry E Allison ’Kant’s transcendental idealism’ p. 315. 
68 Bardon, A. 2006, “Transcendental Arguments”, The Internet Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, ‘, pp. 1-2, 
www.iep.utm.edu/t/trans-ar.htm 
69 Filosofi Leksikon , Red. Poul Lübcke, p. 434. 
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a-vat’. This he does by arguing that if someone asks the question ‘am I a brain-in-a-
vat?’ either the answer is no or the question is meaningless70. 
Kant made several transcendental deductions, among them one of the Moral 
Law. This deduction was based upon the assumption that the categorical imperative is 
the Moral Law, so this deduction is intimately connected with the foundation of the 
categorical imperative. But, if Korsgaard cannot be said to argue in a transcendental 
manner, is that a problem for her position? I suppose the answer to this is both yes and 
no. ‘Yes’ owing to her strong Kantian interpretation of law and its necessity and from 
where her conception of necessity is to come from if not established by a transcendental 
argument, the alternative appears to be naturalism. ‘No’ because of common criticisms 
of transcendental arguments, since what is commonly referred to as Kant’s 
‘transcendental psychology’ is among what’s most frequently criticized in his 
theoretical philosophy71. This criticism is often due to dismissing what is taken to be 
Kant’s view of mental activities as the “imaginary subject of transcendental 
psychology”72.  One influential critic is Barry Stroud, who in his paper “Transcendental 
Arguments”73, presents a case against transcendental arguments – at least in the 
powerful sense of dealing with ‘outer world’ scepticism. He claims that there is no 
transcendental proof against outer world scepticism, and argues for a more modest 
argument claiming that it is enough that we believe in an external world. Stroud 
argument is74 loosely that there are statements which belong to what he calls a 
“privileged class”. That is statements which cannot avoid being true when uttered by 
someone. Even though there are such statements, the sceptic can always argue that there 
are not so. If the task of transcendental arguments to the sceptic is what Stroud claims, 
to show that what the sceptic doubts is in this privileged class, then transcendental 
arguments are shown not to work. Korsgaard does not seem to be, at least not in an 
explicit manner, occupied by the very central aspects of Kant’s philosophy dealing with 
issues such as ‘transcendental freedom’, ‘transcendental deduction’, ‘transcendental 
Ego’ and so on. Thus, there are good reasons to suspect that her ideas of freedom and 
                                                 
70 Skidmore 2001, p. 122. 
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72 P.F.Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, pp. 31-32. 
73 Stroud Transcendental arguments 
74 As explained by Skidmore ‘Scepticism about practical reason: transcendental arguments and their 
limits’ and by Stroud in his ‘Transcendental Arguments’. 
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identity do not rest upon transcendental arguments in this sense. However in one place 
in her text, she claims that her argument for the Moral Law is transcendental. The 
question then arises in what way her argument is transcendental, and how can 
Korsgaard’s argument deal with the kind of criticism as directed by Stroud. To argue 
from the categorical imperative to the Moral Law – or at least a step on the way75, is 
where Korsgaard claims to use a transcendental argument. I will also see if her 
conception of ‘transcendental’ as understood from this argument can explain the 
claimed force normativity is supposed to have on us, and the necessity of moral 
obligations. Or is her theory in need of another undetermined starting point for 
autonomous activities than that represented by Kant’s idea of spontaneity, another 
starting point securing our freedom from the causality of nature? But the question is if 
this is possible. According to Allison, Kant would claim that all theories except his own 
are heteronomous. Since these theories have the form 
 
“”I ought to do something because I will something else” (Gr 4:441; 111). Moreover, 
since this interest, whether sensuous (e.g., in one’s own happiness) or rational (e.g., in 
ontological perfection) reflects the “natural constitution” of the subject, Kant once again 
asserts that in all such cases it is “strictly speaking….nature which would make the 
law”(Gr 4:444; 112)” (Allison 1990, p. 100) 
 
So I guess one concern is whether Korsgaard’s theory has this form, something which I 
find to be a plausible interpretation is exactly the case. 
 
4.2 Transcendental argument for the value of humanity 
Whether or not Korsgaard’s arguments from the categorical to the Moral Law are 
transcendental or not is controversial, and several proposals have been made. One of the 
problems is due to disagreement concerning what is meant by a transcendental 
argument, another problem is due to different readings of Korsgaard. Kant’s 
transcendental deduction of the Moral Law is summarized by Korsgaard as an argument 
which “connects freedom and reason through the capacity of reason for pure 
spontaneous activity which is exhibited in its production of ideas.”(Korsgaard 1996 b), 
p. 161) 
 
                                                 
75 Stern ‘The Value of Humanity: Reflections on Korsgaard’s Transcendental Argument’ p. 15 
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As we have already discussed, this is different from how Korsgaard argues in order to 
establish the Moral Law. Therefore let us take a look at Korsgaard’s arguments. 
 
“The argument I have just given is a transcendental argument. I might bring that out 
more clearly by putting it this way: rational action exists, so we know it is possible. 
How is it possible? And then by the course of reflections in which we have just 
engaged, I show you that rational action is possible only if human beings find their own 
humanity to be valuable. But rational action is possible, and we are the human beings in 
question. Therefore we find ourselves to be valuable. Therefore we are valuable. 
(Korsgaard 1996a, pp. 123-5) 
 
With practical normative scepticism76 Korsgaard refers to doubts about whether rational 
actions exist or not. Thus her argument can briefly be described as taking as a premise 
which also the sceptic would also accept; the existence of human agency and that in 
order to act we need reasons to act. Here I suppose that we are speaking of instrumental 
reasons and not moral reasons. For her, the unconditional starting point is owing to our 
practical identity of humanity, the identity which is a necessary identity to have in order 
to have any practical identities at all. It is the identity based upon us as being conscious 
reflective beings, capable of having and requiring reasons for our actions. Thus rational 
human agency is possible which for Korsgaard includes the idea of a free will. The very 
characteristic of human agency is our reflective consciousness and our search for 
reasons, and that these reasons are in coherence with our practical identities – and, in 
particular, the identity of humanity. Hence humanity is our unconditioned practical 
identity, the identity which stops the regress. This is not possible if you do not value 
your humanity. 
However, her conception of value is not one demanding a strong transcendental 
argument. Value in her opinion is first-personal, something which we find ourselves to 
be, rather than something evaluated from the outside. Therefore we do not need to relate 
to Hume’s scepticism concerning whether there is a world outside us, to whether there 
is anything out there of any value. Hence she does not need to give a strong 
transcendental argument; her argument can be characterized as being modest77. I 
suppose this is so due to her dismissal of what she refers to as substantial realism. Her 
idea of procedural realism would make the appropriate scepticism to be whether or not 
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our procedures or reflections actually exist, which may seem to be obvious – unless of 
course we actually are ‘brains-in-a-vat’ and they would only exist from a third person 
perspective which I guess imply a more substantial realism. 
But how can Korsgaard’s modest transcendental argument establish any kind of 
necessity? It is hard to see how her arguments ending with the Moral Law, can ensure 
obligation and morality, the rationality and necessity at which Korsgaard aims at. In 
what sense is Korsgaard’s argument transcendental? Is it only due to its form as 
described in the introduction, to the structure of what is commonly considered a 
transcendental argument, or does it have anything to do with the necessity it is supposed 
to provide? To explore this concern I will examine James Skidmore’s formulation of the 
argument78 in which the aspect of necessity is more accentuated. He explains 
Korsgaard’s argument as working back from the premise that our humanity is due to 
that we act for reasons, to its necessary conditions. These necessary conditions he 
explains as being the “the necessity of taking something to be normative, of developing 
a ‘normative identity’”, and further the necessity of valuing one’s humanity or agency 
as an end. This, Skidmore claims, is a transcendental argument because it provides ‘one 
rationally necessary end: our own humanity’ it is, as such, an argument going further 
than instrumental reason. Thus to value one’s humanity is not something one arrives at 
by means ends reasoning, it is an end by necessity owing to our rational powers. But, if 
these powers are questionable, that which we are dealing with is human nature or some 
kind of causality. Would that in his view qualify as a basis for a transcendental 
argument? Probably not, I believe to accept this as a transcendental argument requires a 
rather Kantian reading of Korsgaard. 
 
4.3 Universalizability and the necessity to see the value in others 
This first transcendental argument wishes to establish that scepticism of reason is a 
mistake. However, to claim that what is ultimately valuable is humanity, does not rule 
out egoism. To accomplish this Korsgaard advances one further argument, an argument 
against scepticism of moral reason. My question is then: is this also a transcendental 
argument? As we recall she parallels her argument with Wittgenstein’s private language 
argument. This is an argument which is commonly understood as a transcendental 
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argument in the strong sense79. But is this how Korsgaard reads him? And if so, does 
this imply that Korsgaard’s argument too is transcendental in this strong sense? No, it 
does not; Skidmore argues80 and refers to Korsgaard’s interpretation of Wittgenstein as 
saying: 
 
“She suggests that his argument, beginning with the fact that linguistic meaning is 
normative, establishes the publicity of language as a necessary condition for this 
normativity.”(Skidmore 2002, p. 135) 
 
This due to that we cannot have a language which is in principle incommunicable. And 
similarly she wants to do the same kind of argument against private reasons. Since 
reasons must be normative in order to be reasons they cannot be egoist or private 
reasons, but must be public. By valuing our own agency as such, we value the agency of 
others. We have the same public reasons which for that reason also must be moral 
reasons. Skidmore claims that this argument might be transcendental in a modest sense, 
and as such escape Stroud’s criticism. But that is not the same as saying that the 
argument is sound. He claims that the agent-relative conception of egoism is not the 
kind of privacy we need in order to parallel the private language argument, Agent-
relative reasons are not incommunicable in principle to anyone. Skidmore brings this 
argument one step further: 
 
“transcendental arguments for moral reasons would seem to be doomed to fail due 
precisely to the intelligibility of  the rejection of such reasons. Whether or not the 
egoist’s account of reasons is ultimately adequate, it certainly appears to be a coherent 
account. After all, there is nothing incoherent or inconsistent in imagining someone who 
reasons exclusively from the point-of-view of prudence, however impoverished such a 
point-of-view might ultimately prove. As long as this is true, transcendental arguments 
will not succeed in defeating the egoist. They cannot demonstrate the unintelligibility of 
what, in the end, is perfectly intelligible.”(Skidmore 2002, p. 138) 
 
One who I interpret as disagreeing in this is Theo van Willigenburg. He uses as we 
recall the terms shareability and actual sharing to make the same distinctions. If we are 
to act according to the categorical imperative, the reason which we choose has to be law 
like. According to him this means that it must be universal – which he equates with 
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shareable, and it must be a reason by necessity. So he argues that we cannot but share 
what is shareable, and that Korsgaard gives a transcendental argument for this claim.  
Whether Korsgaard’s arguments from the categorical imperative to the Moral Law are 
transcendental or not is hence questionable. But either way there seems to be a problem 
by arguing away from the egoist. I cannot see that Korsgaard manages to accomplish 
this. 
Korsgaard appears to run into two problems. First, how can her constructivist 
view ensure a priori the necessity she seeks for the categorical imperative. Further, how 
can this necessity be also captured in the moral case? But why would what commands 
the free will need to be universal in the first place if the universalizability criterion 
according to Korsgaard cannot get us to morality? Korsgaards reply81 to this I 
understand as being due to the very idea of obligation, that normativity requires some 
sort of law likeness or regularity. It is this law-like formulation universalizability is 
meant to capture. It is meant to capture the necessity which the imperative is meant to 
have on us, the power of causes. Korsgaard asks why these ideas of power and 
normativity cannot stand alone? In answering this, she refers to both Hume and Kant as 
agreeing that causality and regularity are dependent issues. She uses the relation 
between cause and effect and the necessitation binding them, as an analogue to the 
relation between agent and action. 
 
“I need to will universally in order to see my action as something which I 
do.”(Korsgaard 1996a, p. 229) 
 
Regularity or a normative principle of the will is to ensure some sort of unity or 
existence of agency consisting over time. Hence there is an a priori universal principle 
empowering our decisions making us into agents persisting in time, she argues. But in 
what sense is it a priori, given by a transcendental argument? If she is right I suppose 
what this means is that our egoistic decisions have some normative force a priori 
grounded. But does this mean that our rational decisions are determined in some sense? 
No, Korsgaard replies “Laws which cannot be violated cannot be followed either” 
(Korsgaard 1996a, pp. 231-232) When you give yourself a law as an act of the will. She 
continues that essential for an act of the will I that you must make a claim to 
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universality, it must be valid on other occasions and in this sense be general. Is this the 
same that as that an act of the will in Korsgaard’s opinion is primarily linked to rational 
decisions rather than to moral decisions, and that moral decisions are a subset of rational 
decisions? In that case this would oppose her view of moral normativity as superior, and 
our moral identity as inescapable. Is that consistency with one’s owns reasons over time 
are more important than consistency with reasons which we share? 
If one as a thought experiment accepts that her arguments from the categorical 
imperative to the Moral Law are transcendental in the modest sense. What does it 
mean? If Korsgaard’s transcendental arguments are modest ones, so Stroud’s criticism 
does not apply to her, does this mean that she has managed to equate rational agency 
with moral agency? She does not give a ‘substantial’ transcendental argument, but 
argues for something weaker which does not need to assume the existence of an outer 
world, of rational agency or of moral agency. The question then is, does she accomplish 
to argue for what she has set forth? I don’t think so. I agree with Skidmore when 
claiming that transcendental arguments “despite Korsgaard’s efforts, they cannot 
succeed in establishing a rational foundation for morality.”(Skidmore 2002, p. 121) 
That Korsgaard seems, in general, to prefer modest transcendental argumentation, does 
not that imply that she has to give up the idea of synthetic a priori, the idea of 
objectivity and of necessity? To Kant transcendental deductions was the method to 
ground certain concepts and principles as objectively valid. Is this an option for 
Korsgaard? It is unclear in what way Korsgaard’s arguments are transcendental other 
than purely structural, following a procedure similar to what is commonly known as 
transcendental argumentation. But I suppose there is one more aspect to this way of 
reasoning, namely that transcendental refers to a foundation outside of our experience. 
So how does she ground her theory, where does necessity come from? It may be that 
what she has in mind is a procedure, but not in the sense I have just suggested.  
 
“the transcendental distinction is not primarily between two kinds of entity, appearances 
and things in themselves, but rather between two distinct ways in which the objects of 
human experience may be “considered” in philosophical reflection, namely, as they 
appear and as they are in themselves.”(Allison 1990, p. 4) 
 
Perhaps this can be expanded to also relate to Korsgaard’s view, that the transcendental 
distinction is about two different perspectives that one may take in philosophical 
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reflection? In some places she suggests what can support this interpretation, saying that 
objectivity is due to the way we reflect. If so, objectivity is procedural. But again, I 
cannot see how she can avoid serious problems of self-reference when doing this. 
Korsgaard’s transcendental argument was, as we showed, not powerful enough to work 
as epistemic justification. It only took us as far as to what we can believe. Therefore, 
how does she move on in order to justify these beliefs? A modest transcendental 
argument may not be an argument capable of proving that external-world (in 
Korsgaard’s case the existence of rational and moral agency) scepticism is wrong, but to 
aims for the less ambitious task that we are to believe in such an outer world or in 
rational action. The problem then is that even if we succeed in establishing this, the 
sceptic may not be convinced since something we believe may, after all, turn out to be 
wrong. Therefore, even though we believe something - even by necessity - in addition 
we need to justify82 this belief. I presume this is what Korsgaard means in her appeal: 
 
“If you think reasons and values are unreal, go and make a choice, and you will change 
your mind.”(Korsgaard 1996a, p. 125) 
 
Justification is due to conviction. Hence perhaps this conviction is the answer to the 
question on how the categorical imperative can have a hold on us even though it is 
different from the Moral Law? But then what Korsgaard seems to be doing is to justify 
one belief – the belief in the existence of rational agency or in practical reason – with 
another belief – the conviction in the existence of a free will. This associates more with 
Quine’s holistic version of reflective equilibrium than a Kantian theory. Perhaps that is 
not a problem for her to give up, since by leaving the transcendental in a strong sense 
behind, Kant’s way of grounding his system is not available to her anyway. For how can 
spontaneity from the self be anything other than naturalistic, if the self it comes from is 
that of human nature and not a more universal source, universal in the Kantian sense? It 
seems as though Korsgaard’s avoidance of the transcendental and her orientation 
towards Hume leaves her with a notion of universality not capable of grounding the 
categorical imperative in anything other than something private or in nature. Thus she 
ends up with the problem of self-reference, defining the very principles of mental 
activities by a procedure of the very same mental activities. But could this conclusion be 
                                                 
82 Arguments in accordance with Skidmore 2002, p. 124. 
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due to a misunderstanding of Korsgaard, and that she with human nature means 
something more in accordance with the Kantian idea of a rational nature? In order to 
shed light on this, I will explore some ideas from another interpreter of Kant – Henry E. 
Allison. 
 
4.4 Spontaneity, autonomy and authorization 
Allison’s interpretation of the deduction of freedom or of the Moral Law is based upon 
his conception of transcendental idealism – which we recall as the two aspect account. 
Henry Allison argues for an interpretation of Kant emphasizing the connection between 
spontaneity and apperception as being intimate and central, where by apperception he 
means our awareness of ‘I think’. He quotes Kant as saying that apperception is “an act 
of spontaneity”. My concern is whether or not Korsgaard adopts these kinds of ideas or 
not. This is important in understanding how she distinguishes between rational nature 
and human nature. Central to Allison’s discussion of freedom is what he considers two 
varieties of freedom: autonomy and spontaneity. Spontaneity he claims to be rational 
agency’s ability to be self-determinant on the basis of general principles. (Not only 
moral principles). Autonomy, on the other hand, is practical freedom or moral agency’s 
ability for self-determination. Further, according to Allison, in the case of a rational 
deliberator, spontaneity is: 
 
“the capacity to determine oneself to act on the basis of objective (intersubjectively 
valid) rational norms and, in light of these norms, to take (or reject) inclinations or 
desires as sufficient reasons for action.”(Allison 1990, p. 5) 
 
Hence this makes a rational decision dependent on something additional to the causality 
of one’s psychology or mental state it also rests on the act of spontaneity. Korsgaard 
appears to neglect this aspect of Kant’s argument so the question remains: who is the 
author of the law that governs us? What is really Korsgaard’s conception of this? In 
“Realism and Constructivism in Moral Philosophy” Korsgaard outlines Hobbes’s idea 
of a sovereign: Hobbes said that morality is the solution to the problem of what the 
situation would be like without morality. As a horror example he describes a state where 
everyone is at war with one another. In order to solve this situation he argues that 
people must be motivated to engage in some sort of contract with each other. This 
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contract would be to give up ones freedom to a sovereign capable of reinforcing moral 
and legal law and order followed by everyone. In “Reason, Humanity, and the Moral 
Law” G.A. Cohen reformulates some dilemmas originally stated by Hobbes concerning 
the source of the law which binds us: 
 
“You might think that, if you make a law, then that law binds you, because you made it. 
For, if you will the law, then how can you deny that it binds you, without contradicting 
your own will? But you might also think the opposite. You might think that, if you are 
the author of the law, then it cannot bind you. For how can it have authority over you 
when you have authority over it? How can it bind you when you, the lawmaker, can 
change it, at will, whenever you like?”(Korsgaard, 1996a, p. 167) 
 
Cohen describes the main difference between Kant and Korsgaard as concerning who is 
the author of the law that makes claims on us. For Korsgaard it is the subject by 
constructing one’s practical identity who indirectly is the author of this law. For Kant, 
on the other hand, Cohen argues, the situation is more equivocal83. The subject is the 
author of the law in the sense that the law comes from the will. This is necessary since 
to only obey laws from the outside is slavery, heteronymous as such. However, if the 
law only came from my own will, how can it make a claim on me? To this Cohen 
answers that Kant’s individual is designed by nature to make the law by the authority of 
reason. For Kant, the sovereign is our reason, and the source of the imperatives of 
morals cannot be that of human nature or human reason. Only by a transcendental 
grounding of obligation as a priori having their source in pure reason can one avoid 
Hobbes’s concern about the sovereign. To Korsgaard this solution may not be available.  
 
“For Korsgaard, morality is grounded in human nature, and that difference between her 
and Kant is consequential here, for Kant has a ready answer to Hobbes’s argument 
about the sovereign, whereas Korsgaard may have no answer to it, because she has 
abandoned the element of Kant that transcends merely human nature”(Korsgaard 1996 
a), pp. 172-174) 
 
By claiming that the categorical imperative is different from the Moral Law she in some 
way moves closer to determinism. To solely base the lawmaking on human nature, and 
if one wishes to avoid Hobbes’s concern that if you have authority over the law how can 
it have authority over you? The only way for Korsgaard to avoid this, if insisting that 
                                                 
83 Korsgaard 1996a, p. 171. 
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the categorical imperative is not the Moral Law, is to place authority on human nature, 
but then we are no longer free but rather programmed by something/someone other than 
oneself. 
Kant by linking the idea of a categorical imperative with the idea of a Kingdom 
of Ends can be interpreted as been giving the categorical imperative content. It could 
also bee seen as opening up the way for giving emotions such as respect and also 
experience and knowledge some impact on our practical deliberations. By her concept 
of Practical Identity, Korsgaard may appear to be doing the same. However, as I 
understand her, only our reflective self-consciousness - the Practical Identity of being a 
human - is capable of obligating us. Thus by arguing that the categorical imperative in 
some sense is only a law, that it is pure structure, and at the same time having human 
nature as its source, is that not the same as putting form back to nature? If determinism 
comes from within - from oneself – but a self only as representing a kind or a species, 
does it make it any better than if we were forced by some outer powers? If reflection is 
not something which we can escape, and its results are due to laws, then the interesting 
question I do not find to be whether the principles or laws forcing our reasoning is as if 
they were laws of nature, or if they actually are the laws of nature. In any case, in my 
opinion it is a view putting too strong a claim on the causality of our reasoning – 
namely the claim of it being compulsory. 
 
4.5 The value of choice and the causal thesis  
To Korsgaard autonomy seems to mean something else than what Kant had in mind, 
and in many respects one can argue that her conception of autonomy is heteronomous. 
But does this not imply that the categorical imperative is not categorical, but 
hypothetical? If it is hypothetical, is that necessarily a problem? The problem can be 
solved if one does not require from the idea of freedom that it somehow must entail law 
meeting the strong understanding of causality. I believe that the very need to connect 
freedom to law (meaning by necessity) is due to be able to deal with what is considered 
to be a deterministic mechanical world. 
If one’s conception of the scientific world was not so rigid, perhaps one could 
have a conception of freedom and choice not so much in need of strong causality and 
law in our thinking and reasoning either. Scanlon presents a different view, offering an 
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account of right and wrong which is heteronomous and, at the same time, arguing for a 
categorical imperative. But how can he make claims to both a categorical imperative 
and heteronomy? As we recall Scanlon does not make the distinction that Korsgaard 
does in that the categorical imperative is different from the moral law, rather he 
promotes an understanding of universal as meaning ‘for everybody’. He gives an 
account where the moral authorities which Korsgaard claims to be grounded in rational 
or human agency, in Scanlon’s view has its foundation in ‘other aspects of our lives and 
our relations with others’. (Scanlon 2000, p. 6) Scanlon offers a view of responsibility 
not based upon the view of autonomy but rather based upon principles given external to 
us. 
To Korsgaard, value is as we recall something we impose on the world, it is of 
our creation. But her view, I have argued, has a problem of being self-referential; at 
least it is unclear what kind of foundation she gives to prevent this. I turn now to 
explore another view on value which I find does not run into the problems that 
Korsgaard’s view may do. Scanlon argues against the common view that ‘well being’ is 
what he calls a ‘Master value’. In this view to be valuable or good, is a state of affair to 
be promoted in order to bring well being to the individual involved.  Scanlon argues that 
‘good’ is not the only value to promote, we also have values separate from ‘the good’ 
such as friendship, excellence in art and science, love and the value of human life in 
itself. His account is two-fold; first, his idea that value is not only a teleological issue,  
and second he considers the notion of value in an abstract manner: 
 
“being valuable is not a property that provides us with reasons. Rather, to call 
something valuable is to say that it has other properties that provide reasons for 
behaving in certain ways.”(Scanlon 2000, p. 96) 
 
This is what he refers to as the ‘buck-passing’ account of value and goodness owing to 
that to be good or valuable is not to be considered as a reason which to respond  in them 
selves. What we respond to, what serves as reasons for us to act is that to be good or 
valuable has other properties providing such reasons84. He promotes a view on values 
that he calls ‘the value of choice account’, where the important thing is not to choose 
                                                 
84 Scanlon 2000, p. 99. 
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but to have the opportunity to do so, and he claims that this explains our notion of 
responsibility. 
On the basis of this conception of value he can, instead of considering the 
challenge to our idea of freedom and voluntarism as being that of determinism, make 
the weaker claim which he calls the Causal Thesis85: ‘This is the thesis that all of our 
actions have antecedent causes to which they are linked by causal laws of the kind that 
govern other events in the universe, whether these laws are deterministic or merely 
probabilistic’. I suppose this is the same as saying that we cannot accurately predict the 
future, which we could have done with enough information in the deterministic case. 
However, we can give causal explanations of what happened, and probabilistic 
assumptions about what is to come. Predictions about the future, I believe, are 
something one can achieve in controlled and idealized experiments or when dealing 
with ideal theories – theories telling us how things should be in ideal cases. Scanlon’s 
contractualism offers an account of responsibility and freedom not based on the 
assumption of the dualities of theoretical and practical reasoning, or for that sake of 
reasoning and emotions, and yet manages to deal with a world view of science more 
modern than the one Korsgaard’s view can meet. 
I find one of her main problems to be due to her division of perspectives, upon 
on the dualities her view is based. To require that from a third person perspective one 
should aim to deal with determinism is, in my opinion, a too strong a demand. Hence 
the problem that Kant posed concerning the tension between freedom and laws should 
not have had as one of its premises that our conception of freedom needs to deal with 
determinism; but rather seek a scientific world view more in accordance with what 
Scanlon proposes, a scientific world view also dealing with the more probabilistic and 
spontaneous aspects of nature.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
As I have argued, Korsgaard’s distinction between the categorical imperative and the 
Moral Law has lead to some problems. Her arguments confuses whether autonomous 
agency is equal to rational agency, moral agency or to both. Further, her constructivist 
approach in establishing the categorical imperative gives rise to concerns of self-
                                                 
85 Scanlon 2000, p. 250. 
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reference. It is hard to see how her radical constructivism can succeed in establishing a 
rational basis for moral obligations. 
Korsgaard poses the same problem as Kant concerning how to combine the 
issues of freedom and law. In my opinion, one problem lies in the premises for the 
posed problem; the idea that nature is deterministic. Similarly, she adopts the strict 
command from the Formula of Humanity; that is, the command telling us that we must 
never treat anyone merely as means. Basically, I disagree in what she considers to be 
the challenges that have to be met. It is as if she is still fighting the ghosts of Kant, 
which are the ghosts of determinism and egoism. But why care about determinism and 
absolute egoism if one, unlike Kant, wishes to defend a view dealing with daily life 
concerns – or with the ‘real world’? Her ambitious aim of a double-level theory, capable 
of dealing with both practical and more ideal situations I find problematic. Her view 
combining autonomous agency with the belief that morality is grounded in human 
nature, leaves us with a dilemma. If one understands her conceptions of autonomy and 
egoism in a Kantian manner, then morality is grounded in rational nature and one 
misses some of the practical aspects which Korsgaard actually aims at. If one instead 
sees morality as grounded in human nature, then the question is how to justify the 
necessity she associates with the categorical imperative and with moral obligations. In 
my opinion, her double-level strategy results in taking a position that is incoherent. But 
why should the fact that we are the source of the law that binds us, necessarily lead to 
freedom and responsibility? For Kant and Korsgaard this seems to be the solution to the 
problems arising out of seeing nature as deterministic and having an absolutistic 
conception of egoism. If one did let go of these – in my opinion unnecessary – worries, 
autonomy is perhaps not the answer to our quest for responsibility.  
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